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Abstract 
The civil construction industry in South Africa contributes greatly to the occurrence of 
work-related incidents in the country, often leading to injury or fatality. In order for South 
Africa to reduce the high incident rates in this industry, it must first become aware what 
is causing these incidents. The study sets out to provide information regarding the 
causation of incidents within the South African civil construction industry, identifying 
leading incident causation factors in terms of human errors, workplace factors and 
organisational factors. Relationships between these incident causation factors develops 
understanding of the failure pathway which leads to an incident occurring.  
Understanding incident causations can be done through the analysis of incident reports. 
The incident reports are gathered from three South African civil construction companies 
who shall remain anonymous. Each individual incident report is analysed using an 
incident causation framework (ICF) adapted from Jude Bonsu’s work on the South 
African mining industry (Bonsu et al., 2016). A cross-sectional analysis is then done 
across all incident reports, whereby leading incident causation factors and relationships 
between incident causation factors are identified.  
Prior to performing analysing the incident reports, motivation is given of the need for this 
study in the South African civil construction industry. The motivation is given through 
the comparison of incidents between this industry and the South African mining industry. 
The results of this comparison found that the South African mining industry has 
successfully reduced both injury and fatality frequency rates, whilst the civil construction 
data had no statistical significance. Lack of statistical significance indicated a lack of 
control over incidents. The South African civil construction has managed to reduce injury 
frequency rates; however, they were experiencing rates far higher than those of the mining 
industry.  
The findings of this study presented that common leading incident causations were 
occurring for the three companies. For all three companies; mistakes are found to be the 
leading human error; controlled work environment (CWE) the leading workplace factor; 
and hazard identification the leading organisational factor. Relationships were also 
established that linked the workplace factors to the human errors that they cause and 
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organisational factors to the workplace factors they cause. The relationships were 
analysed, and it was found that reasoning could be given to the relationships occurring 
between each of the incident causation factors.  
The research concluded that it had both achieved the objectives set out as well as provided 
benefits that can be applied to the South African civil construction industry. 
Recommendations were also made to promote further studies and application of this study 
to the South African civil construction industry.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 




Die siviele konstruksiebedryf in Suid-Afrika dra grootliks by tot werkverwante voorvalle 
in die land, wat dikwels lei tot beserings of sterftes. Om Suid-Afrika se hoë aantal 
voorvalle in hierdie bedryf te verlaag moet mense eers bewus word van wat hierdie 
voorvalle veroorsaak. Hierdie studie beoog om inligting te verskaf rakende die oorsake 
van voorvalle in die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele konstruksiebedryf, deur die vernaamste 
oorsaakfaktore in terme van menslike foute, werksplekfaktore en organisatoriese faktore 
te identifiseer. Die verwantskappe tussen hierdie oorsaakfaktore ontwikkel begrip van die 
oorsake wat lei tot ‘n voorval. 
Om die oorsake van voorvalle te verstaan, moet verskillende voorvalverslae ontleed 
word. Voorvalverslae van drie Suid-Afrikaanse siviele konstruksiemaatskappye wat 
anoniem sal bly is ontleed. Elke voorvalverslag is geanaliseer en ontleed met behulp van 
‘n insident oorsaak raamwerk wat aangepas is uit Jude Bonsu se werk binne die Suid-
Afrikaanse mynbedryf. Daarna word ‘n dwarsnit-analise oor alle voorvalverslae gedoen, 
waaruit leidende oorsaakfaktore en verwantskappe tussen voorvaloorsaakfaktore 
geïdentifiseer word. 
Voordat die voorvalverslae ontleed word, word ‘n motivering gegee vir die behoefte aan 
hierdie studie binne die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele konstruksiebedryf. Die motivering word 
gegee deur die voorvalle tussen hierdie bedryf en die Suid-Afrikaanse mynbedryf te 
vergelyk. Uit die resultate is bevind dat die Suid-Afrikaanse mynbedryf die beserings- en 
die sterftefrekwensiesyfers suksesvol verlaag het, terwyl die gegewens vir die siviele 
konstruksiebedryf geen statistiese betekenis gehad het nie. ‘n Gebrek aan statistiese 
betekenis dui op ‘n gebrek aan beheer oor voorvalle. Die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele 
konstruksiebedryf het dus daarin geslaag om die frekwensie van beserings te verminder, 
alhoewel hul egter koerse ervaar wat veel hoër is as die mynbedryf. 
Die bevindinge van hierdie studie het aangedui dat die mees algemene oorsake van 
voorvalle by al drie maatskappye voorkom. Vir al drie maatskappye is gevind dat; foute 
die grootste menslike oorsaak is; beheerde werksomgewing die grootste werkplekfaktor 
is; en gevaaridentifisering die leidende organisatoriese faktor is. Verwantskappe is ook 
bewerkstellig wat die werkplekfaktore koppel aan die menslike oorsake wat dit 
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veroorsaak en organisatoriese faktore met die werkplekfaktore wat dit veroorsaak. Die 
verwantskappe is geanaliseer en daar is gevind dat daar ‘n redenasie is vir die 
verwantskappe tussen elk van die oorsaakfaktore. 
Die gevolgtrekking uit die navorsing is dat dit beide die uiteengesette doelstellings bereik 
het, sowel as voordele bied wat binne die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele konstruksiebedryf 
toegepas kan word. Aanbevelings is ook gemaak vir verdere studies en om die toepassing 
van hierdie studie binne die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele konstruksiebedryf te bevorder. 
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
1.1. South African civil construction background  
The civil construction industry plays a vital role in the economic growth and development 
of a country (Oladinrin et al, 2012). As a developing country, much of South Africa’s 
growth and development is dependent on the ongoing maintenance and improvement of 
infrastructure (Ackoff, 1990).  
To better understand the South African civil construction industry there are two 
significant influential aspects; financial and current incident statistics. As with all 
industries in a capitalist economy, whether they are fully-fledged or developing, it is 
ultimately financial sustainability and success that underpins the state of the industry and 
so too influences the future growth. Thus, it is financial aspects that are used as a means 
of understanding the importance of the civil construction industry to the country and the 
people of South Africa. Secondly, industry-specific incident statistics and their impact 
provide reasons as to why methods are required to reduce the occurrence of incidents. If 
these incident statistics are viewed and analysed, it becomes evident that the industry’s 
growth is undermined by the frequent fatalities and injuries to South African civil 
construction employees (Joubert et al, 2005). 
1.1.1. Financial background 
South African civil construction is an industry with a steady 4% contribution to the South 
African Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Okoro et al., 2016). In any economy, but 
particularly in a developing one, any contribution to the national GDP is of significance 
However, civil construction has suffered a general decline in the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) share price from 2014 to 2016 (PWC, 2016). Figure 1.1 shows the 
reduction of approximately 50% in the JSE construction and materials (CONM) index, 
from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2016 (PWC, 2016). The figure demonstrates 
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that despite a difficult economic climate during this period, the JSE All Share Index 
(ALSI) remained constant while conversely, the CONM index declined substantially 
(PWC, 2016). Figure 1.1 demonstrates a slight rise in the JSE CONM index for June 
2016; however, this rise is not substantial in indicating positive future profitability for the 
industry. It is possible that survival in a tough industrial climate resulted in companies 
possible turning to cost-cutting measures to protect their bottom lines but which may have 









This economic downturn and the entry of foreign construction companies into the sector 
led to a highly competitive civil construction market (Joubert et al, 2005). To add to the 
growing competition, many historically disadvantaged individuals took the opportunity 
to establish new companies through the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
(Oyewobi et al, 2014). The influx of these new civil construction companies alongside 
the appearance of established foreign firms in an industry in a country facing a general 
economic downturn creates a difficult environment with negative impacts on the 
profitability of established companies and is a threat to the survival of smaller recently 
developed companies. According to Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), with 
government’s commitment to sustainable development, the industry has a platform for 
future projected growth for those companies which can adapt to the competitive market 
(PWC, 2016). 























JSE Construction & Construction Materials Index JSE All Share Index
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According to Oyweobi, the South African Government’s policy on future sustainability 
will primarily aid in helping the economic growth of larger companies, due to an already 
established dominance of the market (Oyewobi et al, 2014). In a 2016 study undertaken 
by PWC this includes growth of the industry, compliance with laws, and health and safety 
as key risks impacting on future industry growth (Ugwu and Haupt, 2007). Health and 
Safety has a direct impact on productivity and company sustainability. For this reason, it 
is noted that these are of very high concern with regards to future development (Ugwu 
and Haupt, 2007). With regards to the South African civil construction industry incident 
statistics, significant reductions in incidents and the simultaneous improvement in 
employee safety can positively impact the sustainability of the industry. This positive 
impact can contribute to the growth of the South African civil construction industry. 
1.1.2. Incident statistics 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the construction industry is 
responsible for a large proportion of the total international occupational fatalities 
(International Labour Organization, 2015). This estimate is supported with findings that 
construction activities cause approximately 30% of occupational fatal injuries worldwide 
(Okoro et al., 2016). For South Africa the statistics show similar evidence. The incident 
statistics for the South African building industry were gathered from the Federated 
Employers Mutual Assurance Company (Pty) Ltd (FEM). For this study, civil 
construction is defined according to the following FEM subclasses:  
• Civil engineering; 
• Steel reinforcement construction;  
• The erection/dismantling of scaffolding. 
These subclasses apply to the entire region of South Africa thus the totals reflect all FEM 
recorded injuries in the building industry within South Africa. While it is possible that 
some incidents go unreported or in some cases may be reported to institutions other than 
FEM, for the purposes of this study the FEM statistics are used. 
‘Building’ refers to all industries involved in the building sector, of which civil 
construction is a subclass. Figure 1.2 illustrates the number of injuries for the civil 
construction industry compared to the total number of building-related injuries, the data 
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for which is given in Appendix B1 (FEM, 2018). Evident in Figure 1.2 is the high 
contribution from civil construction to the number of injuries occurring in the building 
industry. With a contribution of 36.71%, 2007 was civil construction’s most successful 
year in terms of having made the lowest contribution to total building-related injuries. In 
2010 civil construction contributed 43.05% of building-related injuries, making it the 
worst year in terms of percentage contribution of incidents. The number of injuries in the 
civil construction industry remains fairly constant from 2011 to 2016. 
The number of injuries occurring may be due an industry practice of approaching a 
situation with a reactive response. A reactive response refers to the company holding the 
individual involved in the incident directly responsible thus absolving the employer and 
excusing the employer’s need to improve and implement safety procedures and provide 
a safe working environment. A more detailed investigation is required to see where the 
employer can take responsibility for particular incidents occurring. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, fatal incidents within the civil construction industry account 
for a large proportion of international occupational fatalities and should therefore be a 
major concern to the industry (Okoro et al., 2016). Figure 1.3 illustrates the total number 
of fatalities for both the civil construction industry and the building industry as a whole, 
the data for which is supplied in Appendix B2 (FEM, 2018). From Figure 1.3 it is evident 








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Civil construction Total building industry
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fatalities annually. Many of the years studied demonstrate a steady increase in the number 
of fatalities compared to the previous year. Figure 1.3 presents periods of increase and 
decrease in the number of civil construction fatalities, showing a lack of efficient methods 
of preventing incidents. As with the injury statistics previously discussed, increased 
knowledge of the causations behind occupational fatalities will help to reduce the number 









Figure 1.4 shows the incident frequency rates for South African civil construction 
incidents per year, the data for which is supplied in Appendix B3. This figure shows both 
injuries and fatalities as the two incident types. The number of employees and number of 
incidents data used was gathered from the FEM statistics (FEM, 2018). For calculating 
these frequency rates, the data is normalised for 100 employees using Equation 1.1:  
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠×200000
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 
    (1.1) 
For this formula the 200 000 represents the number of hours worked by 100 employees 
each year (8 hours a day × 5 days a week × 50 weeks a year).  
A high spike in the fatality frequency rate in 2010 could be attributed the 2010 FIFA 
Soccer World Cup hosted by South Africa. With the construction of five brand new 
stadiums and approximately R17.4 billion invested in new infrastructure, the construction 
industry was highly active during this period (Future et al, 2010). With the FIFA Soccer 





































Civil Construction Total building industry
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causing a rush in work and lowered adherence to safety precautions within the workplace 
(Future et al, 2010).  
The frequency rates for fatalities presents common findings as indicated in Figure 1.3. 
Injuries demonstrate steady decline in frequency rates from 2007 until 2016. This steady 
decline reflects positively for the civil construction incident reduction; however, the 
injury frequency rates remain very large ranging from 2.41 (2016) to 4.02 (2007). An 
injury frequency rate this large remains highly concerning over the industries ability to 
control the occurrence of injuries and protect their employees. For fatalities the frequency 
rate fluctuates year-on-year just as the number of fatalities presented in Figure 1.3 
demonstrated. Figure 1.4 demonstrates that fatality frequency rates have not decreased 
consistently from 2007 to 2016, indicating that the variation in the number of fatalities is 
not due to increased workforce numbers. The high injury frequency rates and rapidly 
inconsistent fatality frequency rates supports the requirement for methods which reduce 









Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 have demonstrated the current condition of the South African 
civil construction industry in terms of injuries and fatalities. The incident statistics and 
financial importance established for the civil construction industry indicate the impact 
this industry has on South Africa. A proactive approach for dealing with these incident 
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into the causation of incidents creates the opportunity for the development of means to 
effectively preclude incidents from occurring. 
1.1.3. Key concepts 
In order of understanding the introduction to this study, an explanation of a few key 
concepts is given. The key concepts centre around the understanding of incident causation 
and incident causation frameworks. 
Incident causation is a concept which categorises the actions that took place which led to 
an incident occurring. For this study incident causation is broken up into three factors; 
human error, workplace factors and organisational factors. The causation of incidents 
applies the principle that organisational factors are responsible for causing workplace 
factors, and workplace factors are responsible for causing human error. The human error 
is then the final event undertaken by an individual which resulted in the incident 
occurring. In order to assess incidents and identify the underlying incident causation an 
incident causation framework is required. 
There are various incident causation frameworks which exist across multiple industries. 
Each framework attempts to find the most suitable way to assess incidents, using this 
assessment to find the incident causation factors. Different incident causation frameworks 
apply different methods and different incident causation factors in order to assess 
incidents. Models such as the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS), the Domino effect model, James Reasons Swiss Cheese model and many 
others, have attempted to find the most accurate means to assess incidents.  
The concepts discussed in this section are to provide an understanding of the required 
knowledge to understand the introduction of this. Detailed explanations of literature 
pertaining to this study is given in Chapter 2. 
1.2. Research problem statement 
Against the background of the incident statistics presented in Section 1.1.2, this study 
hopes to provide means to reduce the occurrence of incidents in the South African civil 
construction industry. More specifically, the study will attempt to find methods in which 
individuals can begin to understand incidents in terms of direct and underlying causations, 
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where underlying causations are often overlooked by individuals in charge. Overlooking 
underlying causations focuses blame on the individuals directly involved in the incident, 
this approach to discipline merely shifts blame but does not solve the underlying 
causations. Underlying causations lie at a supervisory and management level. An incident 
causation framework (ICF) is adapted which can be used to identify causations at these 
levels. The problem will be tackled through examination of multiple incidents, gaining a 
cross-sectional analysis opposed to a singular incident analysis. 
1.3. Research questions 
The research problem devised in Section 1.2 leads to the primary research question, which 
is:  
Can a South African civil construction ICF be introduced which is used to analyse 
multiple real-life civil construction incidents, providing links in the three levels of 
causation; human error, workplace factors and organisational factors? 
Through research into this primary question, the following sub-questions need to be 
answered: 
1. Is it necessary to produce an adapted ICF for the South African civil construction 
industry? 
2. Can the adapted ICF provide the leading proportional contributors for each 
incident causation factor over multiple incidents? 
3. Can the adapted ICF provide links between human error and workplace factors 
over multiple incidents? 
4. Can the adapted ICF provide links between workplace factors and organisational 
factors over multiple incidents? 
1.4. Aims 
With statistics supporting the view that this industry has one of the highest rates of 
harmful occupational incidents, the aim of this study is to provide an analysis of the 
incident causation within the specific context of the South African civil construction 
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industry. Due to the nature of the work, civil construction sites present circumstances that 
may be a dangerous to employee safety.  
Through the use of data analysis, the aim is to expose and highlight the number of 
incidents which occur due to specific causations and thereafter provide a link between the 
different incident causation factors. The incident data will be analysed using an ICF based 
on the Swiss Cheese Mark III model and Jude Bonsu’s framework (Bonsu et al., 2016). 
Analysing the incidents using the adapted ICF, causations may be identified across 
multiple incidents as opposed to viewing causation of singular incidents in isolation. The 
analysis will develop the proportional contribution made by the respective causations and 
the relationships between the causation factors.  
Through this analysis into incident causation it is possible that common incident 
causations may be identified within the South African civil construction industry or 
within a specific company. The identification of common causation may aid in the future 
prediction of incident causation and subsequently, the prevention of such by allowing for 
further investigation into methods which aim to reduce the frequency of incidents 
occurring within the South African civil construction industry.   
1.5. Rationale of study 
Analysis of data regarding South African civil construction incidents is essential for this 
study. There is a reliance on three companies for this study to provide the required data. 
These companies will supply the required data regarding incidents which have occurred 
during the completion of their construction projects. 
While the research aims to provide a deeper understanding of incident causation for the 
South African civil construction industry the results will have a direct effect on the three 
companies involved in providing data for analysis. These companies can specifically 
benefit from the analyses, while the research can also benefit the South African civil 
construction industry through viewing all three companies’ data from a singular industry 
perspective.  
The methods discussed provide the possibility of further research in the field of incident 
control. Through understanding of incident causation, controlling the number of incidents 
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occurring becomes a simpler process. Further research may be done into methods which 
deal with each incident causation.  
1.6. Research objectives 
The main objective of this study is to find the common causation of incidents for the 
South African civil construction industry according to multiple factors. This will focus 
on finding causes using an adapted ICF which is to be fully established in subsequent 
sections. To achieve the main objective the following objectives must be achieved: 
1. To perform a comprehensive literature study for the concepts pertaining to this study, 
including: 
• Controls 
• The ‘Energy Damage Model’ 
• Human error  
• Workplace factors  
• Organisational factors  
• ‘Incident Causation Models’ 
2. To provide valid reasoning why the South African civil construction industry requires 
this study using the adapted ICF. 
3. To identify the leading proportional contributors to incident causation factors over 
multiple incidents in terms of:  
• Human error 
• Workplace factor 
• Organisational factor 
4. To provide statistical information showing relationships between the following 
incident causation factors: 
• Human errors & workplace factors 
• Workplace factors & organisational factors 
5. To validate this study and the use of the adapted ICF through detailed interpretation 
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1.7. Assumptions and limitations 
The three companies will provide data that will be analysed for research purposes. The 
data for two of the companies will be analysed by two Honours students and then by the 
researcher. The third company’s data will be analysed by the researcher, a Master’s 
student. This data will consist of incident reports and will be analysed using the adapted 
incident causation framework. The analysis of the data for all three companies will create 
a dataset which will then be analysed providing the incident causation trends over 
multiple incidents. The limitation with this is the potential inconsistency between the 
analyses by the honours students and the researcher. In order to protect the data analyses 
from inconsistency, two provisions were set out. Firstly, the honours students and 
researcher will all work closely with Dr Wynand van Dyk to ensure accurate analysis of 
incidents. Secondly, the incidents analysed by the honours students will be re-examined 
by the researcher. 
The ability to build a strong correlation between the incidents and their causations for the 
South African civil construction industry, depends on the number of accurate incident 
reports assessed. If an insufficient number of accurate incident reports are assessed, the 
data will not be able to be labelled as an industry-wide perspective. To develop strong 
trends in causation an estimated 60 incident reports are required. This number of incident 
reports provides the means for accurate findings into incident causation within the South 
African civil construction industry. 
The incident reports were gathered from three reputable South African civil engineering 
construction companies. For this reason it is assumed that the incident reports are accurate 
in their examinations of the events which led to the incident occurring. 
1.8. Ethical implications 
Examining incident reports requires the researcher to apply ethical regulations which 
adhere to the privacy of the individuals and companies involved. Regulations have 
therefore been devised which allow the study to be conducted in a manner which upholds 
ethical principles. 
The ethical regulations set in place for the research process are as follows:  
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1. Stellenbosch University has certified ethical clearance. The ethical clearance 
certification has been attached in Appendix C1. 
2. Informed written consent was given by each company for their incident reports to 
be analysed and published within the study. The details of these reports included 
the events which led to the incident occurring. 
3. All individuals and companies involved in the incident reports will remain 
anonymous.  
4. Focus of the study is the events which led to the incident occurring and do not 
assess any data based on race, gender, income, education or any other aspect of 
the individual. 
5. Access to all incident reports is only given to the researcher and the respective 
supervisors, Dr Wynand van Dyk and Dr Wyhan Jooste. The honours students 
will have access to the incident reports of the respective companies on which their 
research is based.  
6. Analyses of the incident reports are based on facts, no personal opinion is taken 
into consideration. Findings of the study will thus not aim to favour the company 
or the individual but will remain neutral in content. 
The study attempts to aid in the understanding of the causation of South African civil 
construction incidents. For this reason the study intends no negative impact on the 
companies involved and ensures to hold true to ethical principles. Improvement in the 
understanding of incident causation is the only desired outcome for this study. 
1.9. Research methodology  
The research methodology is to be covered in detail within Chapter 3. For the purpose of 
the study the basic outline of the chapter is as follows: 
1. Introduction to the research process. Highlighting the ordered way in which the 
research was performed. 
2. Providing detail of research into the topic. This section is covered through a 
literature review. 
3. Describing the Incident Causation Framework used, primarily how it was 
developed and implemented. 
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4. Description of the collection and analysis of all data. Data collected was regarding 
three aspects: 
a. South African civil construction incident data 
b. South African mining incident data 
c. Individual incident reports collected from three separate companies 
5. Summary of the chapter. 
1.10. Research report outline 
The study is broken up into various sections labelled as chapters. A brief layout and 
chapter contents is given below. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction provides the rationale for the study. Initially, statistical representations 
are given to display both the economic importance of the South African civil construction 
industry and its current high incident rates. Following this, detail is given into the reasons 
why this study has been performed. In essence this section provides the reader with 
information required to understand the reasoning and means for the study. 
Chapter 2: Literature study 
The literature study builds the knowledge required to understand the material to be 
covered. Concepts covered in the literature study provide the core knowledge for 
following the research. The literature study begins with explaining what leads to incidents 
occurring and how to control incidents. After an understanding of incidents is developed 
the literature study covers aspects required to understand and apply the adapted ICF. In 
order for the reader to follow and understand the study the information given in the 
literature study is fundamental. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
The methodology comprises of the research study, gathering of civil construction and 
mining incident data, gathering of civil construction incident reports and incident 
causation analysis of the incident reports. The methods discussed in the section outline 
the process of data analysis and how the data is displayed. 
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Chapter 4: Incident causation framework 
The Incident Causation Framework aims to provide a detailed explanation into why the 
chosen adapted ICF is best suited to analyse the incident reports. Comparisons are drawn 
between the South African civil construction industry and the mining industry to provide 
reasoning for the requirement of control over incidents. In this section details regarding 
the adapted ICF are given which explain the different aspects and how the ICF is applied. 
Chapter 5: Data analysis and results 
Data analysis consists of analysing the incident reports using the adapted ICF in order to 
find common causations and links between causation factors. Graphical representations 
and analysis are given in Chapter 5. The data matrix is formed using Microsoft Excel, 
whereby each individual incident assessed is populated into a dataset. Finding causation 
proportions for each of the causation factors assessed, namely; human errors, workplace 
factors, and Organisational factors is done in Chapter 5. Lastly, links are established 
between the causation factors. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations 
Conclusions are given in terms of the research results found and contributions to the 
industry. The research results found aim to answer the research questions as well as 
objectives set out in Chapter 1. Conclusions drawn from this study may benefit the South 
African civil construction industry to control incidents by being able to provide 
recommendations. 
Recommendations are given regarding possible future work which is based on this study 
in order to benefit the South African civil construction industry. Realisation of common 
causations provides the framework for further studies into the control of incident 
occurrence. Future work based on this study could provide further benefit for the South 
African civil construction industry. 
1.11. Chapter 1 summary 
Chapter 1 primarily focused on giving a brief outline of the study. Arguments presented 
in Section 1.1 are the reasoning behind the study into the South African civil construction 
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industry. The research problem, research question, aims, rational and objectives, given in 
Sections 1.2 to 1.6, describe the reason for the study. Sections 1.2 to 1.6 also provide 
detail as to why this study makes a relevant contribution to the respective industry. 
Assumptions and limitations and ethical implications, Section 1.7 and 1.8, provide the 
reader with understanding as to what limited the study and the precautions taken to ensure 
the study retains ethical principles. Research methodology, Section 1.9, provides how the 
study was conducted. The outline of the report is given in Section 1.10 for each chapter. 
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Chapter 2.  
Literature study 
2.1 Introduction 
An in-depth knowledge of relevant information regarding a research topic is vital in any 
study. The literature study aims to provide this knowledge to the reader. Various sections 
make up the literature study which help develop the understanding of what causes 
incidents and which makes up the adapted ICF. The knowledge gained through this 
section is applied throughout the study. 
2.2 South African Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) Act 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (OHS Act) serves to protect an 
employee from any hazards that may occur in the workplace (Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 85 of 1993). The main initiative of this act is the prevention of any possible 
harm or injury to an employee due to physical damage (Booysen, 2010). The prevention 
of harm is focused on both the employees in the area, as well as any persons in the nearby 
vicinity. Apart from mines, all workplaces in South Africa (ranging from construction 
sites to regular office blocks) must by law, adhere to the OHS Act. In addition under 
Section 43 of the OHS Act the construction regulations of 2014 must be adhered to 
(Construction Regulations 2014, 2014). 
The construction regulations of 2014 set out the need for a risk assessment. Regulation 
9.1 of the construction regulations states that “[a] contractor must, before the 
commencement of any construction work and during such construction work, have risk 
assessments performed by a competent person in writing” (Construction Regulations 
2014). Efficient risk assessment is then vital for all works in the construction field. 
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The South African Labour Guide (2018) provides guidance on any matter relating to 
labour regulations in South Africa. Risk assessment has  categories (which may be applied 
for a construction-related project) set out by the South African Labour Guide which are; 
baseline risk assessment, issue-based risk assessment and continuous risk assessment. 
(Booysen, 2003). An explanation of each of these three categories is provided below.  
Baseline risk assessment  
Baseline risk assessment provides a high-level overview of possible risks. Assessed risks 
in this section are often very broad and establish a benchmark of the potential risks a 
certain project undertakes. This risk assessment establishes which risks would be 
considered the highest priority (meaning the highest concern regarding level of risk 
severity). This allows for the prioritisation of risk and assessing risk controls, which 
ensures that the control requirements for the particular risk level are met. The information 
gathered within a baseline risk assessment is used to set up risk profiles. These risk 
profiles set out the company’s acceptable level of risk compared to the current risk levels.  
Issue-based risk assessment  
Issue-based risk assessment is concerned with evaluating risks at a higher level of detail 
than baseline risk assessment. This issue-based risk assessment provides steps in 
resolving a known risk, with the objective being to eliminate or reduce this risk. It focuses 
on research regarding methods of how to deal with the risk identified. Dealing with risk 
often involves the selection of the controls (discussed further in Section 2.3) required for 
the focused-on task. The findings of this assessment aim to provide methods of reducing 
or eliminating the risk within the system. 
Continuous risk assessment  
Continuous risk assessment is concerned with the final inspection of all tasks. 
Recommendations are made for the use of checklists in order to establish successful 
operations due to each requirement listed. Through inspection and detailed examination, 
this method can provide a reduction in error due to cancelling a procedure if adequate 
operation requirements are not met. It is the responsibility of a trained professional in the 
field to perform this assessment. 
The OHS Act is set out to provide many of the guidelines for correct working procedures, 
although (due to an almost unlimited number of applicable working procedures) it is often 
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perceived as an impossible task. Due to the impossibility of assessing every work 
procedure the guidelines are set out for tasks considered high risk in terms of incorrect 
working procedures. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory as they set the 
foundation for the South African work safety protocol. These guidelines allow for risk 
assessment to become a more common practice within the South African civil 
construction industry. The risk assessment’s purpose is to quantify the possible 
consequences of a risk that occurs. One of the more adequate methods for dealing with 
risk is the use of controls.  
2.3 Controls 
Controls are essentially safety barriers. One may refer to these as either controls or 
barriers dependent on the user’s discretion. Controls are set in place for two purposes; in 
order to prevent incidents or to protect individuals in harmful situations (Hollnagel, 
1993). Multiple layers of controls produce a system with the aim of preventing incidents 
and protecting individuals. Categorisation of controls identifies the method used for the 
control to aid in the system.  
2.3.1 Control categorisation 
Controls have two purposes, namely prevention and protection (Pinto, 2017). Prevention 
is the act of setting up controls which help reduce the possibility of an incident occurring. 
Incidents occur due to the release of uncontrolled energy from a system which if 
controlled the energy does the required work. Preventive controls keep energy from 
escaping the system in the event of an uncontrolled energy release. For the purpose of 
reducing the severity of damage done by the escaped energy, protection controls are put 
in place. Protection aims to act as a defence in reducing the harm or damage caused in an 
incident (Pinto, 2017). Protection will thus apply to any form of safety equipment which 
is used to minimise the effects of the uncontrolled energy transfer. Figure 2.1 (Image A), 
illustrates how preventive controls form a layer around the energy and Figure 2.1 (Image 
B) demonstrates how the protective controls form a layer around the individual. For 
example, although a stop sign may aim to prevent an incident, it will have no effect in 
reducing the severity of the incident’s outcome. The same concept applies to a safety 
helmet, which does not prevent an incident but will reduce the severity. 
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Erik Hollnagel (1993) suggests that controls can be divided into four categories. These 
categories are based on how the controls act in order to prevent or reduce harm. 
Categorisation is based on both the physical properties of the controls as well as the 
purpose the controls are put in place to perform. From categorisation a description is given 
on how the control performs the task of either prevention or protection. The four 
categories established by Erik Hollnagel (1993) are as follows:  
Material controls 
A material control is a physical object with the purpose of either prevention or protection. 
An example of a preventive material control could be additional support pillars which 
would ensure stability and prevent an incident from occurring. In terms of protective 
controls an example could be the safety equipment used (such as hard hats) which would 
reduce the severity of an incident if it should occur.  
Functional controls 
Preventive functional controls are ‘obstacles’ which must be completed to ensure that the 
individual is focused when completing the task (Hollnagel, 1993). An example is the use 
of a safety button with electrical equipment which prevents accidental start up. Protective 
functional controls act as safety fault mechanisms. These reduce the negative 
consequences of an incident.  The notable difference between functional and physical 
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controls is the lack of a physical barrier. Functional controls focus on slowing down a 
process in order for a higher level of thought to be applied. 
Symbolic controls 
Symbolic controls are made up of any vocal or visual warning used to indicate a possible 
hazard. In layman’s terms, any form of warning system which conveys a message of 
danger may be considered a symbolic control. Symbolic controls may only be preventive 
in nature. An example of these preventive controls is signs which indicate overhead 
hazards as these create an awareness of danger. 
Immaterial controls 
Immaterial controls are based on the expected knowledge of the individual involved in a 
task and are preventative in nature. Various rules set out through mandates, laws and other 
restrictions need to be adhered to for the safe completion of a task. Relevant guidelines 
are communicated to the individuals performing the task based on these rules. People who 
regularly complete certain tasks do not necessarily need to refer to the respective 
guidelines as they are familiar with the practices. The biggest flaw in immaterial controls 
is individuals performing tasks in a manner of their choosing due to guidelines not being 
enforced (Hollnagel, 1993). 
Erik Hollnagel’s (1993) system, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2, classifies each control 
as either preventive or protective in nature.  The preventive category consists of all the 
controls mentioned above, whilst the protective category consists solely of physical and 
functional controls. These categories of controls all form a level of safety which was used 




















Defence in depth is a principle hypothesised by the US nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(Saleh et al., 2010). Defence in depth refers to the multiple defence layers or controls 
which form a system. These layers are put in place to ensure the minimisation of the 
potential of the release of uncontrolled energy through a system failure. The energy 
source discussed is known as the hazard which is present within a system. When the 
control system does fail, hazards result as the source of the release of the uncontrolled 
energy and an incident occurs. This emphasises the level of importance in ensuring 
correct use of controls to form the system. Defence in depth promotes the use of a high 
number of layers which increases the level of safety (Saleh et al., 2010). 
2.3.2 Assessing controls 
Each control must be adequate in terms of preventing or minimising the possibility of 
incidents (Katsakiori et al, 2009). Inadequate controls result in failures present in each 
layer causing the system to fail and an incident to occur. These failures within the controls 
are referred to as holes. If holes are present within the control a path can form which 
allows uncontrolled energy to travel through the system (Hudson, 2014). A physical 
representation of the controls is given in Figure 2.3, demonstrating that each of these 
controls can have holes; however, energy can only escape when these holes line up 










Figure 2.2: Control categorisation adopted from Erik Hollnagel (1993) 
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Through practical research, Dr Abel Pinto (2017) was able to assess his own criteria for 
establishing control effectiveness. The criteria are as follows:  
Adequacy 
This is the degree to which a control meets the design requirements. In the South African 
civil construction industry, the design adequacy refers to compliance with design 
regulations. 
Reliability 
Reliability considers the control’s ability to fulfil its purpose. This is often given as a 
probability of the control being efficient. 
Robustness 
This is the capability of the control to withstand the environment in which it is contained. 
Specificity 
This is the control’s ability to isolate itself from the required damage protection. Thus, it 
will not negatively affect other systems in the process of being effective. 
Figure 2.3: System controls and holes 
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These are the basic requirements to ensure that a layer of controls is effective. If Dr Abel 
Pinto’s criteria are not met, holes form within the control (Pinto, 2017). To further 
understand how these holes form, a method known as the bow-tie diagram can be used. 
2.3.2.1 Bow tie diagram 
The bow tie diagram allows for a visual representation of the potential causes (initiating 
event) and consequences of an incident occurring (Aramis, 2007). This occurrence is due 
to a hazards energy which must be controlled. Inefficient controls which fail to contain 
energy result in the incident occurring. The bow tie diagram applies a visual 
representation of linking hazards, initiating events, controls and consequences involved 
in an incident. 
The process of completing the bow tie diagram, as seen in Figure 2.4, will thus involve 
the following ordered steps (Cockshott, 2005): 
1. Identify the hazard, the source of damaging energy. 
2. Identify the initiating events which would occur. These are the events that can result 
in the loss of control of the hazard’s energy. 
3. Identify the first set of controls which may be set in place. These will be preventive 
controls aimed at preventing the escape of uncontrolled energy. 
4. Identify the possible consequences of each initiating event and the preventive controls 
that failed to prevent the flow of energy.  
5. Identify the second set of controls that must be set in place. These are protective 
controls aimed at reducing the amount of damage done. 
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Establishing controls demonstrates the first step in understanding the prevention of 
incidents. Further understanding of preventing the release of uncontrolled energy is given 
through understanding the energy itself. A model which explains the flow of energy and 
the ability to control said energy is the energy damage model. This model aims to build 
on controls in understanding the events which lead to an incident occurring. 
2.4. Energy damage model 
Borys (2000) states that for work to be done there must be energy present within a system. 
The source of energy is a hazard but if the correct controls are applied there is a successful 
transfer of this energy (Pryor, 2012). Successful energy transfer results in the correct work 
done and incidents do not occur due to an uncontrolled release of energy. 
The Energy Damage Model recognises that exposure to a hazard can result in an incident 
occurring (Culvenor and Else, 1994). The larger the energy source, the larger the amount 
of potential harm that it can cause. Therefore, it is concluded that the size of the hazard’s 
energy is directly proportional to the level of harm caused. The conditions that build up 
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to the incident occurring (as a result of uncontrolled energy travelling through holes) are 
failures within each control, forming holes (Toft et al., 2012). These incidents are 
problematic as they can often result in injury to employees or pedestrians. A hazard’s 
energy needs to be released in one form or another; if uncontrolled an incident occurs and 
if opposing situations result in controlled energy release, correct work is done. To deal 
with all hazards is a seemingly impossible task as the number of sources of energy may 
be considered to be almost endless. To understand energy, categorisation may be used. 
Due to the large range of different criteria, energy categorisation is simplified within this 
research. 
2.4.1. Energy categorisation 
The term hazard is host to various definitions in different fields of research. For the sake 
of this research, a hazard is best defined according to Standards Australia (Pryor, 2012), 
which states that a hazard is a source of potential harm to an individual, property, 
environment or all aspects mentioned. Examples of the types of energy, as defined by 
Viner (1991), are as follows (SIA, 2012):  
Potential energy 
Potential energy is dormant energy which becomes active if triggered. This is primarily 
in the form of structural strain or gravitational energy. 
Kinetic energy 
Kinetic energy is dictated by the object’s momentum. This form of energy is expelled 
through the energy of movement which takes weight and speed into consideration.  
Electrical energy 
Electricity is its categorised as its own singular form of energy. Exposure of an individual 
to electric currents may be detrimental to an individual’s health.  
With reference to the occurrence of incidents the above-mentioned energies are very 
relevant to the civil construction industry. There are, however, various other forms of 
energy. The listed forms of energy merely act as examples, or as a means of grasping the 
concept of energy. It is of primary understanding that all energy allows for the potential 
of an incident if not controlled correctly. 
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2.4.2. Energy damage model evaluation 
Figure 2.5 is an adaptation of the energy damage model demonstrated by Viner (Pryor, 
2012). The model is represented by a hazard and recipient relationship. When all controls 
are in correct working order there are no holes present thus the release of uncontrolled 
energy is prevented (Reason et al., 2006). The first set of controls around the energy are 
the preventive controls. As stated previously if the energy escapes these controls it may 
result in an incident. As seen in Figure 2.5, the energy travels from the hazard to the 
recipient along the transfer mechanism (path the energy follows in order to reach the 
recipient) (Pryor, 2012). For the transfer mechanism to occur the holes within the controls 
must line up with one another. The next set of controls is the external controls which are 
also preventative in nature. These aim to stop the flow of escaped energy heading towards 
the recipient. If the energy flows through holes in the external controls the protective 
controls come into consideration. Protective controls are set in place to reduce the amount 









The amount of energy received above the recipients’ threshold quantifies the level of 
damage done (Abas et al., 2013). Level of damage is thus directly related to the amount 
of energy which is no longer under control. Thus, the size of holes within the controls 
through which the energy travels is directly proportional to the extremity of the incident. 
The amount of energy involved in an incident is directly proportional to the level of 
Figure 2.5: Adaption of Viner damage model 
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damage done. Thus, increased energy could lead to devastating and possibly fatal harm 
to an individual. Efficient methods for controlling the flow of energy should be 
established to minimise the potential of the release of uncontrolled energy. 
To control energy, three methods may be considered. Each of these methods approaches 
the control of energy in a different manner. Ideally, a combination of these methods can 
be more proactive than the use of a single method. To understand these energy control 
methods, the following descriptions are given: 
Minimisation of energy: 
Minimisation of energy focuses on reducing harm through the use of two methods which 
involve either removing the hazard or reducing the hazard’s energy. Dealing with a more 
controllable energy source (Hazard reduction) creates a more stable working 
environment. The first step is hazard identification which isolates the source of energy to 
establish the focus of the energy minimisation methods. To understand each energy 
minimisation method, the following examples are given:  
Removing the hazard: Ensure all objects and equipment not in use are not on site, 
eliminating chances of tripping over objects lying around. 
Reducing the hazard: Uneven surfaces can be levelled to a more acceptable level, 
reducing the potential of tripping and reducing the hazard’s energy.  
Improvement of preventive controls:  
Improvement of preventive controls is gained by placing additional preventive controls 
or improving current preventive controls which are in place. Both methods of preventive 
control improvement reduce the possibility the release of uncontrolled energy (Improve 
controls). To achieve this an understanding of the controls required must first be 
established. One method of establishing the required controls is through the use of the 
bow tie diagram (discussed in Section 2.3.2.1). This diagram displays the controls which 
are set in place when an incident occurs, while simultaneously establishing ineffective 
controls. Once ineffective controls are established a decision can be made on whether 
new controls are required or if improvement of controls is substantial. An example of 
each of the preventive control improvement methods is given below:  
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Additional preventive controls: Securing the entire area with sturdy guard rails when 
working at heights. This eliminates the potential of individuals falling and prevents the 
incident from occurring. 
Improving current preventive controls: If only one row of guard rails is present, place a 
second row, improving on the control already added. 
Prevention of energy transfer: 
Prevention of energy transfer is gained through the placing of additional protective 
controls or improvement of current protective controls (Improve controls). Protective 
controls prevent or reduce the consequences when there is a release of uncontrolled 
energy. Protective controls are the last resort in ensuring limited harm is done when 
energy loss occurs. To understand each energy transfer prevention method examples are 
given: 
Additional protective controls: Adding of a net when working at heights, ensuring that in 
the case where the employee falls the net is in place to catch them.  
Improving current protective controls: Improving the design of personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Improved design offers more shock absorbing technology, restricting 
further damage when an employee is struck with an object. 
Apart from these three methods an additional design principle may be used. This design 
principle is known as safe design. The basis of safe design is the formation of a safe 
environment in which the worker operates rather than focusing on the reduction of human 
error. The safe design principle allows for correction before the escape of energy occurs, 
preventing the potential of energy to cause harm. Safe design focuses on the idea that 
regular maintenance should be set in place in order to reduce the possibility of a hazard 
occurring (Cowley and Borys, 2014). 
2.5. Statistics of hazards involved in incidents 
As established in the previous section a hazard is a source of energy which (if not 
controlled correctly) may result in an incident occurring. According to the previous 
(Energy damage) model an incident has occurred when there is an uncontrolled release 
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of energy. The damage or amount of harm done in an incident is determined by the level 
of energy involved. The second factor which determines damage is the effectiveness of 
the controls to protect the individual from harm caused by the uncontrolled release of 
energy. Although these factors were established earlier, they are mentioned once more to 
contribute to the understanding of this section.  
Figure 2.6 demonstrates the hazards energy release method and the specific number of 
incidents which have occurred due to this within the South African building industry. 
Specific data for the South African civil construction sector is unavailable, therefore, data 
is viewed for the South African building industry as a whole. A large proportion of the 
South African building industry’s incidents are made up by the South African civil 
construction industry, meaning the data is still relevant in understanding which hazards 
most frequently contributed  to incidents (FEM, 2018). Figure 2.6 demonstrates that the 
three largest proportions of incidents are a result of the hazards energy release methods: 
struck by, struck against and slips. Seen within Figure 2.6 these three hazards energy 
release methods are involved in 60% of all incidents. ‘Struck against’ refers the 
occurrence of an individual being knocked up against an object, whilst ‘struck by’ refers 
to falling objects striking an individual. Slips refer to individuals falling on site due to 
various factors. These slips should not be confused with the ‘slip’ human error 
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Fatalities are the most severe form of an uncontrolled release of energy. Figure 2.7 shows 
the number of fatalities attributed to the specific hazards in 2017. The top three hazards 
energy release methods which result in fatal incidents are motor vehicle accidents (MVA), 
personnel struck by objects and personnel falling between levels. As demonstrated in 
Figure 2.7, these three hazards energy release methods are involved in 88% of fatalities. 
From Figure 2.7 MVAs provide a disproportionally large number of the fatal incidents. 
To be more precise, in 2017 MVAs contributed to 62% of fatalities. MVAs are a reference 









A method for the reduction of the number of incidents is the principle of safe design 
(previously discussed in Section 2.4.2). Safe design in essence considers all potential 
hazards which are then planned for with sufficient controls. Through planning there may 
be a reduction in the probability of the uncontrolled release of energy. Supplying these 
statistics allows visibility on the hazards energy release most frequently involved in 
incidents. Understanding this allows for the finding of trends involving hazards which 
result in incidents. These trends may help develop an understanding of where more 
reliable controls are required. More reliable controls may then reduce the amount of 
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2.6. Decision-making 
In order to complete a task various decisions are made, typically involving a decision-
making process. All choices, whether they have large or small effects, are made by means 
of a decision-making process. The resulting decision holds certain consequences, which 
may either be favourable or unfavourable. Favourable consequences are the desired 
consequences of making a decision. These consequences in the South African civil 
construction industry involve construction going according to plan (Joy, 2000). 
Unfavourable consequences are the result of unforeseen circumstances. Unfavourable 
consequences may also be the result of not making a decision when one is required, 
resulting in possible time delays which have incident-related financial repercussions.  
Decisions can further be classified into three categories: 
Strategic decisions  
A strategic decision is made at an executive level. The decision can be made in advance, 
allowing sufficient time for the decision-making procedure. The decision-making 
procedure is divided into the following steps (Ingram, 2018):  
1. Find out all details and prior knowledge of the task requiring a decision. Provide 
an outline of the task requirements. 
2. Identify all possible alternative policies. Listing alternatives allows for analyses 
of what is the most suitable option. 
3. Through analysis of pros and cons identify which policy is most suitable to 
completing the task. 
4. Using the previous point, select the desired policy. This option is chosen at the 
discretion of the administration group, however, step three above aids in building 
an understanding of possible outcomes. 
5. On completion of each step, implement the policy to be adhered to when 
completing a task.  Establishment of a working policy is required by this step.  
6. Monitor the process, controlling it and reducing risks. 
Strategic decisions involve an iterative process of considering all possibilities. Pros and 
cons allow for a level of knowledge regarding the possible consequences of each decision. 
This assessment allows for a timely analysis of alternatives which lead to the final 
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decision. The effects of these decisions may be either long or short term but are more 
often found to have a long-term effect. Thus, they will have consequences in the future 
that may directly affect the company for which the decision is made. 
Tactical decisions  
Tactical decisions are decided at the point of transforming strategic decisions into actions. 
This decision-type falls to middle management. Tactical decisions are by nature less 
complicated than strategic decisions. Unlike strategic decisions, tactical decisions have a 
time constraint factor which affects the decision. The company is required to make 
decisions due to deadlines put in place for task completion. If the decision is not made in 
time for this deadline a required decision has been neglected, leading to negative 
consequences. The tactical decision-making process makes use of previous experience 
and learnt knowledge to influence the decision made. 
Operational decisions  
Also known as frontline decisions, these involve decision-making for day-to-day tasks. 
These decisions are made in an 'auto-pilot' frame of mind, meaning there is no in-depth 
planning. The more competent a person becomes in executing a task, the more the 
decision-making mode shifts from tactical (i.e. 'how to') to operational (i.e. 'auto pilot'). 
Bad work practices are often connected with operational decisions as past unfavourable 
practices being repeated dictates decision-making (Joy, 2000). 
In performing basic tasks, operational decisions are most common. Operational decision-
making in basic tasks often results in individuals not processing slight changes in the 
work situation. This lack of cognitive thought is a potential danger when the task is 
slightly altered as human error may then occur.  
Correct strategic decision-making has the ability to affect the other two forms of decision-
making. The strategic decision-making process can lay a foundation for further decisions, 
through the creation of appropriate policies. Tactical decisions will have to follow these 
policies set out in the strategic decision-making process.  
Addition of more functional controls can be set out in the strategic decision-making 
process. The functional controls can then have a positive impact on the reduction of the 
number of incidents occurring due to operational decision-making (Hollnagel, 1993). 
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Through addition of controls within the process, human error is less likely to occur due 
to a lack of cognitive thinking.  
Correct decision-making can be summarised as having the ability to avoid human error. 
Through the correct use of procedure, the possibility of mistakes and violations occurring 
is minimised. Accurate decision-making is the first step as a corrective measure for the 
reduction of human error. 
2.7. Human error 
Through the knowledge supplied in Section 2.3 and 2.4, an understanding has been 
developed into the theory of what leads to an incident occurring. Once understanding is 
gained that the release of uncontrolled energy is responsible for incidents, knowledge then 
needs to be developed as to what steps to set in motion the failure of controls and the 
release of this energy. To quantify this energy flow and the potential to do harm the term 
‘risk’ is applied. 
Risk is defined as the likelihood of harm occurring due to a hazard (Western Sydney 
University, 2015). Incidents are directly related to risk which is a function of both the size 
of the hazard in a system and the controls set in place to control the hazards energy flow. 
The first factor of risk is the hazard size which is determined by the amount of energy the 
hazard holds. The second risk factor is the controls set in place to prevent an uncontrolled 
energy release. When the risk is too high and an incident occurs, human error is the final 
action performed by an employee which results in an incident occurring.  
The dominant hazards involved in human error, discussed in Section 2.5,  have remained 
the same from years 2015 to 2017 (FEM, 2018). This repetitive pattern shows a lack of 
ability to control these specific hazards, therefore, an inability to cope with current risks. 
The civil construction industry is facing a particularly hard time to learn from incidents 
and set corrective actions in order to reduce risk (Lopez et al., 2010). The flaw with many 
investigations into the incidents is the lack of attention to visible trends. This lack of 
attention highlights an environment of not learning from the incidents that have occurred. 
Instead, a reactive solution is used in blaming the individual involved in the incident. This 
does not allow the development of why the individuals’ actions resulted in the incident.  
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As human error is the last step which leads to the release of uncontrolled energy, 
understanding of incidents should be developed from this point. Human error can be 
categorised to develop visible trends involving incidents within the South African civil 
construction industry. If knowledge is developed on which human error is allowing 
incidents to occur, prevention of incidents becomes a more attainable goal. 
2.7.1. Human error categorisation 
Human error may be categorized under the following subheadings (Lopez et al., 2010): 
Slips  
A slip error occurs primarily due to a design flaw which the worker does not consider at 
the time of the incident. These errors are also due to incidents in which the worker is not 
made aware of a change in design. They are usually distinguished by a temporary gap in 
judgement when performing an ‘auto-pilot’ action (Patterson and Shappell, 2008). Thus, 
slips are often associated with operational decision-making. 
Lapse  
The ideology behind this is an operational decision-making process paired with a design 
flaw, similar to the concept of slips. These forms of failure are due to a lapse in judgement 
because of memory loss in correct task completion processes. These involve a 
misunderstanding regarding the work’s intention versus the performance when 
completing the work (Lopez et al., 2010).  
Both a slip and lapse may be due to an individual being exposed to what may not be 
considered an ‘acceptable’ amount of work (Patterson and Shappell, 2008). This is a task 
design flaw. An individual should not be exposed to excess work as this will create a 
decrease in concentration and, by doing so, promote the operational decision-making 
process. The basis of improving this work is to improve the design of a task. By improving 
the design of the task, there can be a reduction in the possibility of an error occurring.  
Mistakes  
Mistakes primarily occur as a result of the misapplication of knowledge. The individual 
attempts to deal with a situation in a way that is not acceptable. The worker has the right 
intentions and believes their plan will not fail, however, the plan does fail (Bonsu et al., 
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2016). The individual has the correct platform to perform the task but often fails due to a 
lack of experience. 
Violations 
These human errors involve individuals going against set rules, assuming that the rules 
are clear to the individual involved before performing the task. Reasoning behind a 
violation may be an attempt to shorten the completion period of tasks, the reduction of 
the required effort, the underestimation of the risks involved, and the reduction of costs. 
Corrective measures required to deal with violations differ for each violation incurred 
(Mason, 2001). The following two subheadings categorise violations:  
Routine violations 
These violations are common practice. Workers will generally perform a task in 
a way practised by others. Regular practice of this task occurs even if the worker 
is not adhering to the correct procedure. This is often due to peer pressure resulting 
in common practices used (Mason, 2001). These violations often indicate a flaw 
in the work system as individuals are performing tasks however they choose. Lack 
of leadership and corrective action are visible when routine violations are 
occurring. The workers are often aware that they are violating safety rules. With 
this knowledge they still go through with the task in the incorrect manner. In the 
case where the worker is not aware and just assumes he is correct, based on the 
other employees opinions, this is categorised as a mistake.  
Deviant violations 
Violations considered being out of the ordinary, are deviant violations. They are 
violations committed by a select few and are not the ordinary practice of many. 
Deviant violations do not indicate a trend within the workplace to performing 
tasks in an unwanted manner (Lopez et al., 2010). These individuals take the 
method required into their own hands and attempt a task based on their own 
discretion. 
2.7.2. Methods to reduce the occurrence of human error 
Individuals must be made aware of any hazards faced when completing a task. The 
individual must also be aware of how to act in the case of a release of uncontrolled energy. 
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For this reasoning training is set out to educate individuals on hazards and how to respond 
to the uncontrolled release of energy. In some cases, training is considered an inefficient 
method as it creates an increase in operational decision-making (Joy, 2000).  
Increase in operational decision-making may reduce the rate of mistakes, however, it will 
also increase the rate of slips and lapses. Instead, correction of task design flaws may be 
a more efficient method of reducing incidents. Ideally, correction of task design flaws can 
solve both the mistakes, and slips and lapses. A method known as Poka-Yoke is discussed 
in Section 2.7.2.1 regarding reduction in mistakes, slips and lapses. 
To improve on violations an increased focus is given to the following of safety 
procedures. Safety procedures are set in place for the safety benefit of the employees 
involved in a task. This must be made clear to these individuals. According to a study 
conducted by Rebecca Lawton, the leading cause of violations is due to working more 
quickly, with inexperience and time pressure being the second and third leading causes 
(Lawton, 1998).  
A quicker way of performing a task indicates a lack of concern to comply with safety 
procedure, as quicker methods often overlook various safety aspects. As the second 
leading cause of violations, inexperience is the direct result of insufficient training. If 
inexperienced individuals are trained correctly for all required tasks, there should be no 
instance where the individual is unaware of the correct work procedure. The third aspect 
of time pressure results in similar consequences to the use of quicker methods. Tasks are 
rushed, overlooking particular safety aspects. 
2.7.2.1. Poka-yoke 
In order to reduce the number of slips, lapses and mistakes, Dr Shigeo Shingo developed 
a method known as Poka-yoke (Dudek-Burlikowska and Szewieczek, 2009). Poka-yoke 
is a Japanese term which is translated as ‘Mistake Proofing’. The method makes use of 
devices that ideally ‘fool-proof’ a system. This is through the use of controls which 
perform repetitive tasks, where otherwise an operational decision-making process made 
by an individual is used (Tommelein and Ballard, 1999). The reduction in operational 
decision-making reduces the probability of slips and lapses occurring. The increased use 
of controls will also act in reducing the probability of a mistake occurring. 
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The idea of Poka-yoke is designing a system which is very basic to use. One such example 
is an on-site elevator not being operational unless the doors are closed. This reduces the 
possibility of the elevator being used in a dangerous manner.  
Dr Shigeo Shingo categorises the Poka-yoke method as having two categories of 
regulatory functions (Shingo, 1986): 
1. Control functions 
This method of regulation is known to be the more effective function of the two. 
It operates on a detection system which notices irregularities within a specific 
control. Once these irregularities are detected, motions are set in place to either 
correct or stop operations. Shigeo Shingo specifically demonstrated that if the 
system has the ability to correct inefficient controls, then shutdown is not required. 
If the system cannot correct itself, shutdown is required. 
2. Warning functions 
This form of Poka-yoke control makes use of a warning system. The operation of 
this system relies primarily on phonic and/or visible warning signals, such as 
sirens or flashing lights. These signals indicate when an error occurs within a 
faulty control. The system does not shut down automatically or correct the faulty 
procedure. It will merely allow for the individuals nearby to be notified by the 
warning signals. Corrective actions or precautions are then utilised by the 
individuals, as set out by the system.  
A system of blame placed on the individual involved in the incident may fail to resolve 
fundamental issues. A deeper investigation beyond human error may lead to finding 
accurate incident causations, which, if resolved, may greatly reduce the number of 
incidents. The deeper issues focus on workplace and organisational factors (supervisory 
and management-level incident causations). A reactive response to incidents overlooks 
the workplace and organisational factors and focuses on the human error. This research 
develops findings into the workplace factors that may have been a contributing factor to 
the human error which occurred. 
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2.8. Workplace factors 
Irrespective of a systems design level, it is part of human nature for human error to occur 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001). Workplace factors are the causation of incidents at a 
supervisory level and allow the human error to occur. Design preventing workplace 
factors does have the ability to reduce the number of incidents occurring or the 
consequences of an incident. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
is a causation model that allows for the identification and prevention of incidents that may 
occur (Li and Harris, 2005). There are various other models which make use of workplace 
factors; HFACS is merely an example of one such model. 
Weigmann’s paper refers to preconditions of unsafe acts which may be synonymous with 
workplace factors (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001). These preconditions contribute to an 
unsafe work environment possibly resulting in incidents. The HFACS model recognises 
adverse mental state, adverse physiological state, physical/mental limitations, crew 
resource management and personnel readiness as the workplace factors (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2001). The authors of the HFACS paper consider their classification to be too 
complex for accurate identification of incidents (Bonsu et al., 2016). This is evident as 
the classification system focuses on the mental state of individuals. Without in-depth 
information regarding these individuals this is difficult to examine and or to make any 
conclusions on. 
The Nertney wheel is the preferred form for the classification of workplace factors 
(Bullock, 1979). This is because it allows a far simpler examination of the workplace 
factors. The four crucial concepts of the Nertney wheel are the establishment of personnel 
requirements, plant and hardware requirements and procedural and managerial control 
(Bullock, 1979). These four concepts allow for a means of analysing workplace factors 
that are contributing to incidents. For the purpose of this paper, the workplace factors 
have the same name as used in the Jude Bonsu incident framework (Bonsu et al., 2016). 
These are competent people (CP), safe work practice (SWP), fit for purpose equipment 





Page | 39  
 
Competent people  
This requirement ensures that the correct people are employed to perform the desired task. 
Competent people (CP) ensure that the level of training and expertise of the individuals 
meets the required skill level of the desired task. The individual performing the task 
should be competent to do so. 
Safe work practice  
Safe work practice (SWP) ensures that the procedure used for the completion of a task 
considers all safety aspects, prioritising the safety of the employee above all else. If there 
is no procedure set out for the completion of the task, there is inadequate SWP 
(Construction Regulations 2014, 2014).  
Fit for purpose equipment  
Fit for purpose equipment (FFPE) ensures the equipment used is of an adequate standard 
and is suited to the completion of the task. An adequate standard of equipment ensures 
no malfunctions or any other issue whilst in use. Equipment prescribed in the construction 
regulations ensures the equipment used is suited to the task (Construction Regulations 
2014, 2014). 
Controlled work environment  
A controlled work environment (CWE) ensures an adequate safety standard within the 
construction site. The key goal of CWE is a safe work environment for all individuals in 
terms of the both physical and behavioural environmental aspects. Physical aspects are 
with reference to the materials present that may pose a risk of harm to individuals. 
Behaviour is the way in which individuals conduct themselves, whereby correct 
leadership should ensure non-dangerous behaviour whilst working. 
The workplace factors can be simplified using the Nertney Wheel shown in Figure 2.8 
(Bullock, 1979). All the workplace factors must be considered adequate for their required 
task. If all these factors are adequate for task completion it creates a safe working 
environment (SWE). The concept of CWE encapsulates all the other workplace factors 
as for a working environment to be considered under control all the factors (CP, SWP, 
FFPE) must be met. Each workplace factor is still an individual concept and CWE is 
considered its own concept in terms of the definition supplied. 
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As described, workplace factors play a large role in the potential of an incident occurring. 
When there is an incorrect procedure used within the workplace, it creates holes in 
controls for the potentially damaging energy to travel through the system. Workplace 
factors hold a key concept in understanding incident causation. For this reason they are 
taken into consideration when discussing the Incident Causation Models (ICM).  
2.9. Incident causation models and frameworks 
The South African civil construction industry has demonstrated a lack of ability or 
perhaps, willingness to learn from previous incidents (Lopez et al., 2010). In order to 
change this, individuals must first understand the causation of these incidents. Incident 
causation is a systematic process which aims to identify causes of human errors, 
workplace factors and organisational factors involved in incidents. These incidents 
generally do not occur due solely to a single control failure but due to numerous controls 
which fail. Management of companies often make the error of focusing their attention on 
the on-site error (Bullock, 1979).  
The on-site error is the visible act that resulted in the incident, i.e. the human error which 
occurred. An investigation further into the cause of the incident beyond the on-site error, 
may allow for the development of a deeper understanding of what led up to the incident. 
Further investigation brings attention to both workplace and organisational factors. If 
these factors are understood, corrective measures may be taken on a supervisory and 
Figure 2.8: Nertney wheel adapted from Jude Bonsu 
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management level. Dealing with incidents at a higher level changes the response from a 
reactive to a proactive response. Without the use of an incident causation analysis, 
reactive disciplinary measures are taken, ignoring deeper problems within the company.  
The use of an incident causation model (ICM) is fundamental in finding the different 
factors that led to the incident. When dealing with an incident, a causation model should 
be applied consistently throughout the workplace. The importance of applying an ICM 
consistently is to provide constant analysis of incidents and findings regarding common 
incident causation. The Swiss Cheese model is advised within the field of construction 
(Reason et al., 2006). For the sake of this study the adapted incident causation framework 
(ICF) is based off both the Mark III Swiss Cheese model and Jude Bonsu’s adapted 
model. The reasoning behind this decision is given through the explanation of numerous 
ICMs considered.  
2.9.1. Domino effect model 
Herbert W. Heinrich established the domino effect model as early as 1930 (Abdelhamid 
and Everett, 2000). Although this model has had many adjustments over the years, the 
main concepts remain relatively unchanged. Heinrich places emphasis on senior 
management as the key to ensuring prevention of incidents. The model predicts incidents 
as a chain effect of collapsing dominoes, whereby each domino represents a different 
aspect of the working environment. The theory divides incident causations up into five 
dominoes as defined below (Ghasemi et al., 2013): 
Domino 1. Social environment and ancestry  
Domino 1 refers to the workers’ undesirable traits gained through work experience. 
These traits may cause incidents due to the individual’s stubbornness in performing a 
task in a manner which does not adhere to strict guidelines. The work procedure used 
is often related to the individual’s social environment. This means that the lessons 
learnt through everyday interactions often dictate these decisions made. 
Domino 2. Fault of person  
Domino 2 continues from Domino 1 in that the fault of the person is developed 
through actions learnt within the social environment. Incorrect work practice from 
one individual can often spread to multiple individuals performing tasks incorrectly. 
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Individuals are influenced to perform tasks in a manner which does not conform to 
guidelines through the process of routine violations. There is insufficient corrective 
action to fix this behaviour. Thus, behavioural trends spread from one individual to 
another. 
Domino 3. Unsafe act or unsafe conditions  
Domino 3 depicts conditions which arise from poor working conditions. Regulation 
of the manner in which tasks are performed should be in place in order to reduce the 
occurrence of unsafe acts. The association of unsafe acts is often with the SWP 
workplace factor. Dominos 1 to 3 are responsible for what causes the ‘accident’ (A 
term used in the Domino Effect model which is avoided in incident causation as it 
depicts fault of the individual involved. Focus is given to the term ‘incident’ rather 
than ‘accident’ in other sections of this study). 
Domino 4. Accident  
Domino 4 depicts the final event which occurs due to the above conditions. The final 
event is the resultant incident which may cause harm to one or more individuals.  
Domino 5. Injury  
Domino 5’s injury refers to the consequences when an incident has occurred. Injury 
is the consequence of all the previous dominos knocking over the fifth and final 
domino. Injury can result in any form of harm to one or more individuals and may 
even be considered fatal. 
Figure 2.9 is a visible demonstration of the domino effect model. Demonstrated in Figure 
2.9 is that if Domino 1 falls, each domino collapses creating a chain effect resulting in 
injury. Heinrich stated that if one of these dominoes is removed the chain effect will not 


















Two findings were concluded in connection with this ICM according to Abdul Rahim 
Abdul Hamid (Rahim et al., 2008). The first of these is that incidents are caused by 
people, thus human error is the cause of incidents. Whether this is direct or indirect, the 
human factor is a cause of incidents. Secondly, incidents are preventable with correct 
management of individuals.  
The researcher believes that the opinions generated by this model are outdated and lack 
understanding. These findings indicate that the use of a reactive solution would be 
acceptable; however, this is not the case. The following are three arguments as to why the 
domino effect model is not considered accurate for assessing incident causation: 
1. The domino effect model does not take an in-depth look into the causation of 
incidents. Viewing Domino 2 as ‘Fault of Person’ demonstrates that further 
assessment is not done as to what led to the human error. The study requires a 
model which takes a more detailed look into the causation of incidents, as incident 
causation is more complex than simply due to human error. 
2. Heinrich states that if one domino is removed the domino effect is not possible 
(Toft et al., 2012). This is inaccurate as the removal of one domino does not stop 
an incident from occurring. For example, if domino 2 is removed (fault of person) 
an incident can still occur as latent incidents do not contain any human error. 
3. The domino effect model indicates that all incidents result in injury which is not 
accurate. Incidents are the release of uncontrolled energy, which may be released 
Figure 2.9: Domino model 
(Hosseinian and Torghabeh, 2012) 
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in a form which causes material damage but does not harm any individuals. Near-
miss is a category of incidents where no injury was caused in the uncontrolled 
release of energy. 
The three points demonstrate why the Domino Effect model is not suitable to be used 
in assessing incidents for this study.  
2.9.2. HFACS Model 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a model originally 
developed to analyse Human error of incidents in the aviation industry (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2001). The developers of this model, Scott A Shappell and Douglas Wiegmann, 
were attempting to decrease the high incident rates present in the aviation industry 
(Shappell and Weigmann, 2000). HFACS was based on the Reasons 1990 model, 
showing how an incident causation model can be adapted for a specific industry 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001). 
HFACS not only views Human error as the direct cause of the incident but views it as a 
supervisory and managerial error. Applying human error as a direct cause, supervisory 
error and organisational error, the HFACS model uses the following four-level system for 
the examination of incidents: 
1. Unsafe Acts - Occurring at a lower level, unsafe acts are the direct cause of the 
incident occurring. To categorise unsafe acts they are broken up into errors and 
violations. 
2. Preconditions for unsafe acts – Conditions which exist and should be investigated 
as they may lead to an incident occurring. Preconditions are associated with the 
state of equipment used or state of the individual using the equipment. The state 
of the individual or equipment should be assessed as adequate before completing 
any task. 
3. Unsafe supervision – The supervisor at this level has direct contact with the 
individual involved in the human error. Often an incident occurs due to a lack of 
direct leadership to ensure that guidelines are adhered to by employees. 
4. Organisational influences – Management level decisions which may include 
elements such as protocol, task design, equipment used and employee guidelines. 
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If managerial decisions provide an unstable foundation on which a task is 
performed, the probability of an incident is increased.  
HFACS provides an example of adapting Reasons 1990 model to a specific industry. As 
an incident causation model HFACS is well structured and understandable. The two key 
issues in adapting HFACS for the civil construction industry are: 
1. The model is defined for the aviation industry which has little in common with 
the civil construction industry. A more suitable industry model should be adapted 
for civil construction. 
2. The direct cause, supervisory errors and organisational errors are not further 
categorised. The study aims to find the leading causation of incidents for each of 
these error levels. From this the study requires a model which further categorises 
the error to provide a deeper understanding of incident causation. 
HFACS as a model is not suited to the study of incident causation in the civil construction 
industry. Other models are assessed which may be better suited to the study. 
2.9.3. Wheel of misfortune 
The wheel of misfortune is based on a concept known as Helmreich’s concentric spheres 
(O’Hare, 2000). Figure 2.10 displays the wheel of misfortune which attempts to depict 
incidents as a sphere made of different layers, hence the concept of concentric spheres. 
Starting from the inside of the sphere indicated in Figure 2.10, the innermost sphere 
represents local actions, the middle sphere represents local conditions and the outermost 
sphere represents global conditions. The wheel of misfortune divides local conditions into 
task demands, interface and resources. Global conditions are divided into policies, 



















Each of the different layers is assessed detailing at each level what caused the incident. 
Local actions are categorised using the Rasmussen model as firstly an action, goal or 
strategy and then as either skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based (Toft et al., 2012). 
Global conditions focuses primarily on the recognising of hazards. Hazard recognition is 
the key concept for reduction in incidents according to this model. The middle sphere’s 
primary categories are subdivided according to Roth and Woods (1998) cognitive triad 
as follows: 
• Task Demands –  Complexity, coupling, dynamism and risk. 
• Interface –  Displays, controls and communication. 
• Resources –   Physiological, psychological, skills and attitudes 
For the use of this model the following key concepts are indicated making it unsuitable 
for this study: 
1. Local actions categorisation is open to interpretation; there should be more rigid 
categorisation to allow for consistency. 
2. Categorising of local conditions is very complex and is open for interpretation. 
Different users of this system may find different solutions for the same problem. 
The model is not suitable as a framework over multiple incidents due to a large 
room for error. 
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3. The model places zero emphasis on the control of energy within a system. Focus 
is on the identification of hazards not on the control of hazard energy. 
4. The model’s success in the aviation industry does not support it for the civil 
construction industry. As previously mentioned for the HFACS model, aviation 
and civil construction are very different industries. 
Based on the categorisation of incidents used in this model, it is not suitable for the study 
of incident causation for the civil construction industry. 
2.9.4. Swiss cheese model  
James Reason developed the Swiss cheese model as a form of incident causation in the 
late 1980s (Reason, 2000).  
The model acts as a means of evaluating incidents in terms of the incident causation. The 
Swiss cheese model is made up of various slices of cheese as demonstrated in Figure 2.11. 
Each slice of cheese represents an individual control such as those discussed in Section 
2.3. Controls are in place to prevent any energy from slipping through the system and 
being released in an uncontrolled manner. The controls form a system of layers whereby 
increasing the number of controls or layers decreases the probability of an uncontrolled 
energy release.  
Figure 2.11 depicts holes of various sizes which represent the failures in each barrier. The 
Swiss cheese model conceptualises that in the scenario where each of these holes line up, 
the energy can escape and the system is no longer under control. The now uncontrolled 
energy results in an incident occurring. These holes are sporadic and are constantly 
changing, and it is thus hard to predict where they may occur and how they line up 





















Figure 2.12 depicts a visual representation of the Swiss cheese Mark III model which is 
an extension of the original Swiss cheese model. Synonymous with the original Swiss 
cheese model it makes use of controls set in place to prevent energy from escaping the 
system. The model aims to firstly identify the hazard which was the source of the energy 
and is involved in the incident. The next step is to identify which controls failed and the 
cause of their failure. The failed controls allowed for uncontrolled energy to travel along 
the failure pathway resulting in an incident.  
Swiss Cheese Mark III depicts the process which is undertaken when an incident does 
occur. The model looks at the unsafe acts which occurred which are referred to as human 
error. After the human error is established the workplace factors which were discussed 
in Section 2.8 are determined. SWP, CP, CWE and FFPE are the workplace factors that 
are considered for this model. The final link is due to organisational factors which occur 
at a management level, focusing on executive decisions regarding task design, protocol 
and employee guidelines. What went wrong within these steps will help depict the full 
picture regarding the incident causation. 
 
Figure 2.11: Swiss cheese model 
(Hosseinian and Torghabeh, 2012) 




















Two types of failures, namely latent and active failures, cause these holes. Each of these 
is defined as follows:  
Latent failure 
The concept of the latent pathway is that the decision is made at an Organisational level 
and is directly visible from this action (Bonsu et al., 2016). These are conditions caused 
by workplace and organisational factors and are based on strategic decision-making. 
Often, they are decisions made which remain dormant and suddenly come into effect 
when activated due to a certain activity. Latent failures are often an unrecognisable form 
of failure until system failures occur (Reason, 2000). In some cases, the energy path is 
recognisable and there is no corrective action that has been used.  
Active failure  
Active failures are related to the time and place of the uncontrolled release of energy 
occurring as the system failure is immediately noticeable. Association is often made 
between active failure and human error as this is the immediate action which caused 
failure (Bentley, 2009). Active failures may be seen as a symptom of a system functioning 
incorrectly, thus stemming from workplace and organisational factors (Reason et al., 
Figure 2.12: Reasons Swiss cheese Mark III model 
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2006). Active failure pathway is thus from the organisational level, through the workplace 
level and finally human error (Bonsu et al., 2016).  
Criticism of the model highlights the lack of explanation regarding the holes. There is no 
specification to identify a hole and the degree of failure of this hole. Thus, the size of the 
holes has no specifications and is not fully understood. 
The Swiss Cheese Mark III model provides crucial concepts in the development of ICMs. 
The concept of controls and the linking up of failures (holes) to cause an incident is vital 
for understanding energy flow. Swiss Cheese Mark III provides a basis to adapt an ICF 
for this study. The researcher used the Swiss Cheese Mark III model along with Jude 
Bonsu’s adapted framework to adapt a framework for the civil construction industry. 
2.9.5. Adapted framework by Jude Bonsu 
Jude Bonsu is responsible for the creation of an ICF for the mining industry, adapted from 
the Swiss cheese mark III model (Bonsu et al., 2016). Jude Bonsu developed this 
framework as he believed that the  model at present was ‘overly complex and did not 
adequately account for all the factors that contribute to accidents in the mining industry’ 
(Bonsu et al., 2016). The civil construction and mining industries are very similar in 
practice. Due to these similarities, the framework developed for the mining industry can 
be adapted for the civil construction industry.  
Jude Bonsu’s framework maintains the core concept of the Swiss cheese Mark III model. 
The Swiss Cheese Mark III diagram, Figure 2.11, visually depicts this framework. 
Controls and the development of holes within these controls is a key concept maintained 
in Jude Bonsu’s ICF. If these holes align, the energy can travel through these controls and 
result in an incident. This is synonymous with the explanation given in Section 2.9.4 on 
the Swiss Cheese model. The key sections of the framework focus on causal analysis, 
hazards and barriers (controls) (Bonsu et al., 2016). 
Causal analysis is comprised of three subsections, namely proximal causes, workplace 
factors and systemic factors (Bonsu et al., 2016). Proximal causes are synonymous with 
the human error discussed in Section 2.7 and are the direct cause of an incident. Proximal 
causes are, therefore, part of the active failure pathway resulting in an incident. Workplace 
factors are as defined in Section 2.8, and therefore keep the same classification as the 
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workplace factors used in Jude Bonsu’s ICF. Workplace factors are then the result of 
systemic factors.  
Systemic factors refer to causation at the top level of an organisation. For this reason and 
the purpose of this study, these factors are synonymous with the aforementioned 
organisational factors. The top level of decision-making is responsible for the systemic 
factors involved in an incident. Thus, systemic factors are found at the beginning of the 
failure pathway. Systemic factors are separated into the following reasons (Bonsu et al., 
2016):  
• Training and competence 
• Contractor management 
• Design 
• Management of change 
• Hazard identification 
• Monitoring and auditing 
• Maintenance management 
• Resource provision 
• Strategic decisions 
• Risk management 
• Leadership 
• Work scheduling 
• Emergency response 
Jude Bonsu’s ICF was established using the Swiss Cheese Mark III model and adapted 
for the mining industry. From this knowledge an adaptation is made for a civil 
construction-specific ICF based on Jude Bonsu’s ICF. This study uses the civil 
construction-adapted ICF to investigate multiple incidents occurring in the South African 
civil construction industry. 
2.10 Chapter 2 summary 
Chapter 2 has the objective of supplying the reader with the required knowledge to 
understand the contents of the study. Beginning with an introduction of the South African 
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OHS Act in Section 2.2, the chapter provides understanding of government rulings on 
how the South African civil construction industry must protect employees. Sections 2.3 
to 2.6 supplied insight into crucial concepts in understanding the theory behind how 
incidents occur and the means to control incidents. Understanding the theory behind 
incidents gives the reader an understanding as to why an ICF can be crucial. Stipulating 
of human errors and workplace factors, Section 2.8 and 2.9, demonstrate the first two 
causation aspects to be assessed using the ICF. Finally, Section 2.9 described an array of 
incident causation models and frameworks, explaining how the relevant framework was 
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Chapter 3.  
Methods and data 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 discusses the data and the data assessment methods used for this study. Various 
ICFs were discussed in Section 2.9. However, for the purpose of this study the framework 
developed by Jude Bonsu based on the Swiss Cheese Mark III model, Section 2.9.5, 
provides the basis of the adapted incident causation framework (ICF) used (Bonsu et al., 
2016). Jude Bonsu’s framework was adapted to suit the South African civil construction 
industry. Chapter 3 is focused on providing a detailed explanation of what constitutes 
assessable data, along with a discussion into how the adapted ICF was applied.  
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the six separate stages of the investigation process. Stage 1 
(literature study) consists of a research process in which an investigation was done into 
understanding the theory of incident causation and different incident causation models 
(ICM) and frameworks. Stage 2 describes the process of choosing the most suitable 
ICF/ICM. The chosen ICF/ICM was adapted to be used within the context of the South 
African civil construction industry. Stage 3 entails the data collection process, looking at 
what is considered suitable data for the study. Stage 3 also involved the process of finding 
suitable corporations to approach for the required data. The corporations were selected 
by the supervisor-in-charge, as these people could supply enough relevant information to 
produce detailed incident investigations.  
Stage 4 motivates the requirement for this study using the adapted ICF and describes how 
the adapted ICF is applied. The motivation entails a section of data analysis, where 
comparisons are made between incident statistics for the South African civil construction 
and mining industries. Stage 5 contains the data analysis and discussion of results. This 
stage involves the assessment of the gathered incident reports and categorises the incident 
causations according to the adapted civil construction ICF. This allows for findings based 
on the different causation factors, namely human errors, workplace factors and 
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organisational factors. Statistical analysis regarding the incident reports is used to give 
feedback on the common causations of incidents. Stage 6 ends off the study by drawing 



















The first three stages of the study are discussed in the subsequent sections within Chapter 
3. Stage 4 and 5 are introduced in Chapter 3 but are covered in greater detail in Chapters 
4 and 5. Stage 6 is not discussed but is applied in Chapter 6. 
3.2. Literature review 
The literature review done in Stage 1 provides the foundation of this study. Understanding 
why incidents occur takes the first step in understanding incident causation. Once the 
reasoning behind why incidents occur is established, detailed descriptions are given to 
better understand ICFs/ICMs. To demonstrate the gathered knowledge to the reader a 
literature review is constructed in Chapter 2. 
Figure 3.1: Research process 
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Knowledge is presented in a logical format in the literature review, whereby new concepts 
are explained and are understandable for readers from all academic backgrounds. The 
literature review begins in Section 2.1 by discussing the South African OHS Act which 
ensures the safety of all workers from potential hazards. The OHS Act enforces the 
control of all hazards and the use of a risk assessment in the South African civil 
construction industry (Construction Regulations 2014, 2014). Information in the OHS 
Act stipulates hazard control and the reduction of incidents as a key priority for all 
industries.  
Section 2.3 begins to explain controls, which are set in place to control the hazard’s 
energy. Controls describe ways to prevent incidents or reduce the harm caused through 
the restriction of energy flow. To understand the flow of energy, discussion of the Energy 
Damage Model is given in Section 2.4. Discussion of the Energy Damage Model 
subsequent to controls in the literature review is due to the necessity for the reader to 
understand how controls work before understanding the energy which needs to be 
controlled. Hazards are stipulated in the Energy Damage Model as the source of 
potentially damaging energy. 
Hazards left without any form of effective control are responsible for the release of 
uncontrolled energy and lead to an incident occurring. Section 2.5 uses FEM statistics to 
describe which hazards are most frequently involved in incidents in South Africa. The 
statistics are also used to describe the frequency rate involved with particular hazards.  
Section 2.6 outlines the decision-making process applied by individuals. Decision-
making applies the basic operational process and is the first step in applying the correct 
controls to potentially damaging energy. Using the adapted ICF the decision-making 
process can be examined for particular incidents. 
The adapted ICF evaluates incidents based on human errors, workplace factors and 
organisational factors. Human errors and workplace factors are discussed in Sections 
2.7 and 2.8. Organisational factors are discussed in Section 2.9 within the descriptions 
of the various ICFs and ICMs. Each incident discussed is used to evaluate the best suited 
ICF/ICM to the current study, finding Jude Bonsu’s adapted model to be the most 
consistent with the examination of the South African civil construction industry.  
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The literature review provides the reader with all the required knowledge to understand 
the remainder of this this study. The methods used to implement the South African civil 
construction adapted ICF is explained in detail in Section 3.3.  
3.3. Incident causation framework 
The ICF chosen to adapt for the South African civil construction industry was based on 
the research done in Section 2.9 (Stage 2). Jude Bonsu applied James Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Mark III model to the mining industry to establish a relevant ICF (Bonsu et al., 
2016). From Jude Bonsu’s work, an ICF has been adapted for the South African civil 
construction industry.  
Stage 4 motivates the use of this study and the use of the adapted ICF in Sections 4.2.1, 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Comparison of the data gathered (Stage 3) for the South African civil 
construction and mining industries (Section 4.2.1) acts to possibly motivate the 
requirement for an improvement in incident control for the civil construction industry. 
Further motivation is given by describing effective incident control initiatives used by the 
mining industry (Section 4.2.2). Section 4.2 concludes by providing reasoning as to why 
this study using the adapted ICF can benefit the South African civil construction industry 
in terms of better understanding incident causation (Section 4.2.3). Explanation of how 
the adapted ICF is applied to individual incident reports is given in Section 4.3.  
In order to analyse individual incidents, the adapted ICF firstly focused on the controls 
(described in Section 2.3) which failed or should have been in place. After establishing 
the controls for the individual incident, each incident was analysed to determine causation 
factors in terms of human errors, workplace factors and organisational factors. Each of 
these factors has been previously discussed within Sections 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. Applying the 
method used in Section 4.3, all 66 individual incident reports are analysed to begin Stage 
5 of the research process. 
The analysis is done for multiple incidents across three South African civil construction 
companies creating an incident causation database. Analysing multiple incidents allowed 
for the establishment of a cross-sectional view of incidents, whereby incidents are not 
viewed in isolation. The cross-sectional view establishes the leading incident causation 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 57  
 
factors (human errors, workplace factors and organisational factors). A proportional 
analysis is done to find the proportional contributors for each causation factor, after which 
links are established between the separate causation factors.  
3.4. Data collection and analysis 
Stage 3 of the study is the collection of data which occurred as three categories of data. 
Category 1 is the collection of South African civil construction incident statistics from 
the FEM. Sections 1.1.2, 2.5 and 4.2 make use of the FEM data.  In Section 4.2 the FEM 
South African civil construction incident statistics are compared to the South African 
mining incident statistics. The South African mining incident statistics were collected 
from the Minerals Council of South Africa (MCSA) and the South African Department 
of Mineral Resources (DMR). This is category 2 of the data. 
Category 3 consisted of 66 incident reports from three South African civil construction 
companies. All incident reports are analysed using the adapted ICF to find common 
incident causations. Analysis of the collected incident reports is given in Chapter 5, which 
substantiates the use of the adapted ICF for the South African civil construction industry. 
Each category of data in the collection process can be substantiated in Sections 3.4.1, 
3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively. 
3.4.1. South African civil construction incident statistics 
FEM established itself as a workmen’s compensation insurance company for the building 
industry in 1936 (FEM, 2018). By permission of the Department of Labour Compensation 
Fund, FEM is licensed to provide Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act (COIDA) cover to the building industry’s employees (FEM, 2018).  
All employers must register with COIDA to provide financial cover for their employees 
and for this reason FEM contains a large portion of civil construction incident data. Since 
FEM remains an optional service it does not contain records of all the data regarding civil 
construction incidents in South Africa. FEM provides individuals with relevant 
quantitative data regarding the number of employees, injuries and fatalities for the 
building industry.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 58  
 
The FEM separates their quantitative data into various subclasses based on work fields. 
From the FEM subclasses; civil engineering, the erection/dismantling of 
scaffolding/shuttering and the erection/dismantling of steel structures make up the civil 
construction incidents. All regions of South Africa are assessed for each of the above-
mentioned subclasses. After these statistics have been gathered, they are compared to the 
South African mining incident statistics, in accordance with Stage 4 of the research 
process. The comparison provides a means to evaluate current incident trends in the South 
African civil construction industry. If it is found that the South African civil construction 
industries incident trends are unfavourable when compared to the mining industry, an 
argument can be developed for the use of the civil construction adapted ICF. 
3.4.2. South African mining incident statistics 
Category 2 data, which consisted of South African mining industry incident statistics, was 
gathered from the South African Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and the 
MCSA (Minerals Council South Africa, 2018a; Department of Mineral Resources South 
Africa, 2018) . The use of two sources was due to specific annual reports missing from 
the DMR’s dataset, therefore missing data was gathered from the MCSA. Comparisons 
were made regarding the statistics for each data source to ensure that they corroborated 
one another’s statistics. The data gathered for the mining industry is of the same content 
as that gathered for the civil construction industry, also covering all regions in South 
Africa. The data collected is quantitative in nature, showing the number of each kind of 
incident which has occurred. Brief descriptions for each of these sources are as follows: 
• South African Department of Mineral Resources (Department of Mineral 
Resources South Africa, 2018):  
The DMR is a branch of the national government with the goal of creating a 
globally sustainable and transformed minerals and mining sector. It is the 
responsibility of the DMR to protect the health and safety of communities and 
individuals affected by mining, whether they are local residents or employees. 
Mining companies in South Africa must compile an annual report regarding 
incidents and present this to the DMR. The DMR is responsible for consolidating 
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• The Minerals Council South Africa (Minerals Council South Africa, 2018a): 
Previously known as the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the MCSA assists 
the mining sector through strategic support and advice. Support is given through 
the MCSA’s membership of the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM), which aims for a safe, fair and sustainable mining industry. MCSA 
ensures that when an assessment of the mining industry is done by the DMR, the 
assessment is done in a previously agreed upon manner. The data used and 
assessed by both the DMR and MCSA has the same content, as the MCSA is set 
in place to survey the DMR. 
After the collection of quantative incident data, the data analysis was performed using 
graphical representations to find incident trends for both industries. These trends in 
incident numbers and incident rates were used to develop the argument for an adapted 
ICF in the South African civil construction industry. 
The comparison of the two industries develops the argument as to why an adapted ICF is 
necessary for the South African civil construction industry. The adapted ICF is then 
applied to assess the incident reports gathered. 
3.4.3. Incident reports 
Category 3 data consisted of incident reports for the South African civil construction 
industry. The incident reports were gathered from three separate South African civil 
construction companies who remain anonymous throughout the study. The content of the 
incident reports was details on the events which led to an incident occurring. The incident 
report sampling was performed by individuals involved in the respective companies. The 
student and supervisor were not involved in selecting the incident reports.  
Incidents cover a range of injury types, namely; near-miss, lost-time, serious and fatal. 
Near-misses are incidents where there was an uncontrolled release of energy that did not 
result in any individuals being harmed. Lost-time and serious injuries are minor and major 
injuries. Fatal incidents are incidents where a worker has lost their life performing a work-
related task, often detailing a lack of adequate protective controls on the civil construction 
site. All injury types involved in incidents are considered in the understanding of incident 
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causation. The sampling is made up of 8 fatalities, 8 serious injuries, 25 lost-time injuries 
and 25 near-miss injuries. 
Each individual incident report is significant for the overall analysis of the South African 
civil construction industry. An example of an incident report provided by a company 
involved in the study is given in Appendix D1. The three companies’ incident reports 
have the same content as the report supplied in Appendix D1. Stage 5 of the study focuses 
on both the analysis of individual incident reports using the adapted ICF and grouping the 
findings into an incident causation database which is then analysed. 
Section 4.3.1.6 demonstrates the analysis process of using the adapted ICF for the incident 
report given in Appendix D1. The incident reports provide an explanation of the events 
which occurred on the South African civil construction site that led to an incident 
occurring. Detailed incident reports provide the researcher with the required information 
to apply the adapted ICF for examination of individual incidents. The ICF’s primary goal 
is establishing the relevant human errors, workplace factors and organisational factors 
involved in each individual incident.  
In total 66 incident reports were collected and analysed; this gives a wide range to better 
understand incidents and eliminate the notion of reviewing incidents as singular events. 
Assembling the analysis of all individual incident reports provides a database. Analysis 
of the database provides the leading incident causations in terms of human errors, 
workplace factors and organisational factors over multiple incidents. 
For the first analysis of the database human errors, workplace factors and organisational 
factors are all given in terms of the proportional contribution made by each type of the 
relevant factor (e.g. Human errors given in terms of the type of human error). Sections 
5.3.1.1, 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.3.1 divide each causation factor into the proportional contribution 
made by each type of the specific factor. 
In Section 5.3.2.2 each type of human error is given in terms of the proportional 
contribution made by the associated workplace factors. The equivalent concept is applied 
in Section 5.3.3.2, whereby each workplace factor is given in terms of the proportional 
contribution made by the associated organisational factors. Linking these incident 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 61  
 
causation factors provides relationships which can lead to better understanding of incident 
causation in the South African civil construction industry. 
3.5. Research design 
The research done in this study focuses on the analysis of incident causation for multiple 
civil construction incidents. To form the best level of understanding the study is done 
using a qualitative study supported by quantitative methods, the study design is thus a 
combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Analysis is done to determine which incident causation factors are linked to another, as 
well as which causation factors result in the majority of incidents. The research done is 
for the purpose of getting an insight into civil construction incidents; it is investigative in 
nature thus qualitative. The qualitative research is supported by the data analysis which 
uses numerical methods. 
Numerical methods provide the quantitative section of the study. Quantitative research is 
done using the structured ICF to analyse incidents and then classify the incident causation 
factors. Numerical proportions create understanding as to which incident causations 
provide the largest proportion of incidents for each of the three different factors (human 
error, workplace factor and organisational factor). The numerical proportions also detail 
relationships between the three incident causation factors by determining the proportion 
of the workplace factors which caused the specific human errors and the proportion of 
organisational factors which caused the specific workplace factor.  
The qualitative study is thus developed and supported using quantitative means. The 
combination of both qualitative and quantitative means offers the strongest possible study 
design.  
3.6. Chapter 3 summary 
The methodology breaks this study up into six stages. Stage 1 is given through the 
literature review (Chapter 2) and builds core knowledge for understanding the contents 
of the study. Stage 2 uses the knowledge gained in Stage 1 to choose a suitable ICF to be 
used for this study. Minor changes are made to the ICF created by Jude Bonsu to adapt a 
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relevant ICF for the South African civil construction industry. Stage 3 is the collection of 
the three different data categories. The three data categories accounted for gathering the 
South African civil construction incident statistics, the South African mining incident 
statistics and the incident reports from three South African civil construction companies. 
Stage 4 (found in Chapter 4) motivates and supports the use of the adapted ICF and the 
benefits made by this study in understanding incident causation. Stage 5 (found in Chapter 
5) applies the adapted ICF, first analysing individual incidents and then combining all 
individual incident analyses into a database. The database is analysed to provide 
information on incident causation for the South African civil construction industry. 
Conclusions and recommendations are drawn from the study, making up Stage 6 (found 
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Chapter 4.  
Incident causation framework 
4.1. Introduction 
The incident causation framework (ICF) developed by Bonsu (2016) was adapted to focus 
on the civil construction industry (CCI), ensuring that all incident causation factors 
analysed are relevant to this specific industry. The CCI has a large number of hazards 
which are unique to that industry. A number of the incident causation factors were 
therefore adapted slightly to account for hazards relevant to the CCI. Knowledge gained 
in other ICFs (Section 2.9) was used to adapt the framework to the CCI. The adaptation 
of these incident causation factors to the CCI is given in Section 4.3.1.3 to 4.3.1.5. 
The adapted ICF is used for the analysis of multiple incidents that occurred in the CCI, 
whereby the multiple incident analyses are used to compile an incident causation 
database. The incident causation database allows for a cross-sectional view of incident 
causation over multiple incidents. Relationships between incident causation factors are 
identified using this cross-sectional view of multiple incidents. These relationships could 
indicate links between the incident causation factors and areas where the CCI can improve 
on current safety performance.  
This chapter motivates the reasoning behind the use of the adapted ICF in the context of 
this study. After motivation for this study and the requirement of the adapted ICF has 
been given (Section 4.2), an explanation is given on how to apply the adapted ICF 
(Section 4.3). This chapter provides the reader with an explanation as to why this study 
differs from previous studies and aids the CCI as a means of potential reduction in the 
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4.2. Motivation for using the incident causation 
framework  
The first aspect of this section demonstrates the reasoning as to why the South African 
CCI requires improved safety, based on the South African CCI incident statistics. In order 
to promote the requirement for improved safety in the CCI, comparisons are drawn with 
the incident statistics of the South African mining industry.  
The South African mining industry is known to be hazardous, with a large number of 
incidents and fatalities (Okoro et al., 2016). Over the past decade, a significant amount 
of effort and attention was invested by multiple individual mining companies, labour 
unions, the industry as a collective and government in order to address the number of 
incidents occurring in the mining industry (Hermanus et al., 2015). 
Current mining initiatives which were set in place to reduce the number of incidents 
occurring are discussed in Section 4.2.2. Mining incident reduction initiatives are 
discussed to provide reasoning as to how the industry has attempted to reduce the number 
of incidents occurring. The last aspect discussed in this section gives reasoning as to how 
this study differs from previous studies (Section 4.2.3). 
4.2.1. Comparison of South African civil construction and mining incident 
statistics 
The work done in Section 4.2 has contributed to a separate study, a submission of an 
article for publication done by the author (Allsopp and van Dyk, 2019). 
The civil construction incident statistics were collected from a wide spectrum of project 
sizes, ranging from small-scale construction projects to larger-scale and more time-
consuming projects. Using the Federated Employers Mutual Assurance Company (Pty) 
Ltd (FEM) database’s subclasses, the South African civil construction incident data for 
the period of 2006 to 2016 was obtained and analysed (FEM, 2018). Incident data of the 
same nature was gathered for the South African mining industry from the South African 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and the Minerals Council of South Africa 
(MCSA), this data was described in Section 3.4.2.  
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The South African mining industry and CCI incident statistics are compared, revealing 
that the mining industry’s implementation of initiatives in recent years to reduce the high 
incident rates have been effective. If this implementation has been effective in the mining 
industry, the CCI can learn from this in order to introduce their own initiatives to reduce 
the number of incidents occurring. This study takes cognisance of the fact that there are 
fundamental differences between the mining and civil construction industries. However, 
it is argued that the comparison is relevant due to the large number of incidents in each 
industry. In civil construction an additional hazard is working on public roads. Mining 
does, however, have hazards which the civil construction industry does not, such as 
falling of ground which is the leading cause of incidents according to the DMR 
(Department of Mineral Resources South Africa, 2018). These industries were compared as they 
are two of the most hazardous industries internationally (Professional evaluation and certifcation 
board, 2019). If it is proven that one of these industries has made steady reductions in the 
number of incidents occurring, comparisons can be made to prove the other industry can 
make similar reductions. 
Mining in recent years has adopted policies which highlight methods for incident 
reduction, through aspects such as the Culture Transformation Framework (CTF), to be 
discussed in Section 4.2.2 (MHSC, 2011). Even with these improvements, the mining 
industry is still one of the most hazardous industries in the world; however, as the hazards 
are always present, the mining industry has found means to control the energy in a more 
effective manner (Simpson et al., 2012). 
Comparison of the South African civil construction and mining industries begins with the 
fatality statistics, comparing the number of fatalities (Section 4.2.1.1) and then comparing 
the fatality frequency rates (4.2.1.2) for the two respective industries. After the 
comparison of fatality-related data, the injury frequency rates of each of these industries 
are compared to substantiate a further argument of industry safety. Both the mining and 
civil construction data are South African statistics as these are most relevant to the study.  
4.2.1.1. Number of fatalities 
Figure 4.1 shows the annual number of fatalities for both the civil construction (see 
Appendix B2) and mining (see Appendix E1) industries gathered from the sources given 
in Section 3.4. Figure 4.1 is crucial as fatalities provide an empirical argument to support 
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the need for improved incident control. As seen in Figure 4.1, the number of civil 
construction fatalities displays no statistical correlation over time, as confirmed by the 
0.97 p-value of linear regression which has been applied to the data (see Appendix F1). 
The mining industry displays a linear regression p-value < 0.05, showing that the trend is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval.  
Although there is no trend over time and it falls within the variation of distribution, the 
CCI saw 33 fatalities in 2007 and 35 fatalities in 2016, whilst the mining industry has 
managed to decrease its number of fatalities from 220 in 2007 to 73 in 2016 (p-value < 
0.05). While the number of fatalities in the CCI has been found to be varied in distribution 
over the 10-year period, a stable reduction in the number of fatalities is simultaneously 
visibly demonstrated by the mining industry with a decrease of 67% from 220 in 2007 to 
73 in 2016.  
The argument does exist that the CCI has a significantly lower number of fatalities; 
however, the study aims to view whether the industry has been successful in reducing the 
number of fatalities over the time period. From Figure 4.1, the data demonstrates that the 
CCI has seen no significant reduction in the number of fatalities, thus fatality reduction 








 Figure 4.1: Annual number of fatalities for each industry 
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Fatality frequency rates which normalise the number of fatalities by the number of 
employees in the industry, can be calculated using statistics gathered from the relevant 
sources. The fatality frequency rate uses the number of employees and can either support 
or reject previous statements regarding the two industries. The statement is supported if 
the mining industry fatality frequency rates also have a decreasing trend and the CCI 
fatality frequency rates also prove to have no trend or an increasing trend. Therefore, to 
build on from the number of fatalities, assessing the fatality frequency rates is the next 
logical step in the argument. 
4.2.1.2. Fatality frequency rates 
Figure 4.2 shows the fatality frequency rates for both the civil construction (see Appendix 
B3) and mining (see Appendix E2) industries, over the 10-year assessment period. The 
fatality frequency rate is calculated by standardising incidents per 100 employees and 
using Equation 4.1:  
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠×200000
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 
     (4.1)1 
The CCI fatality frequency rate has a p-value > 0.05, therefore once again proving to be 
statistically insignificant. Conversely, the fatality frequency rate of the mining industry 
has a p-value < 0.05 (see Appendix F2), making the negative trend statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence interval.  
In 2009, Figure 4.2 shows the mining fatality frequency rate decreasing below that of 
civil construction and remaining there until the final year of assessment in 2016. CCI 
reduced below that of mining briefly in 2011 and then rose again in the following year, 




1 For Equation 4.1 the 200 000 represents the number of hours worked by 100 employees 
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industry in 2016. Figure 4.2 creates the argument that the mining industry has not only 
had a consistently reduced fatality frequency rate, but that since 2009 it has also presented 
a fatality frequency rate lower than that of the CCI. As the hazards in these two industries 
are similar, the mining industry must therefore be capable of a higher level of control over 










In order to fully assess incidents, injuries which were not fatal are also considered. When 
a loss of energy control occurs, the only elements separating a fatality and an injury are a 
protective control or the magnitude of the energy involved, demonstrating the possible 
link between fatality frequency rates and injury frequency rates. 
4.2.1.3. Injury frequency rates 
The study of an industry’s incidents is not only concerned with fatalities, but also analysis 
the frequency rate of injuries. To calculate the injury frequency rate the number of injuries 
is exchanged with the number of fatalities in Equation 4.1 (see Section 4.2.1.1). The 
injury frequency rates for both the CCI (Appendix B3) and the mining (Appendix E2) 
industry were calculated and displayed in Figure 4.3. As the injury frequency rate for CCI 
is significantly higher than that of the mining industry, the two industries’ injury 
frequency rates are plotted with separate axes. Both industries’ data is proven statistically 
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p-value = 4.33E-05 p-value = 0.29 
Figure 4.2: Annual fatality frequency rates 
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Figure 4.3 shows civil construction with an injury frequency rate for 2007 of 4.02, a high 
rate when compared to the 2007 injury frequency rate of 0.82 for the mining industry. A 
positive sign is the reduction in civil construction injury frequency rate from 4.02 (2007) 
to 2.65 (2012). The rate of reduction in civil construction injury frequency rates decreases 
from 2.65 (2012) to 2.41 (2016) over the 5-year period.  
The civil construction injury frequency rate is more than three times greater than that of 
mining at any point in the 10-year assessment period. The much larger injury frequency 
rates indicate that employees in the CCI have a higher probability of suffering a 
workplace injury compared to employees in the mining industry. Even though the mining 
industry experiences a much lower injury frequency rate it has also experienced a negative 
trend. From 2007 to 2016 the mining industry reduced injury frequency rates from 0.82 
to 0.61. Although the focus of the study is incident trends and the CCI has managed to 
reduce the injury frequency rate, the proportion by which the rate is greater than that of 
the mining industry is concerning.  
The CCI experienced injured employees at a rate of 2.41 injuries per 100 employees in 
2016 compared to the rate of 0.61 per 100 employees in the mining industry. Similar 
hazards are experienced by both these industries yet injury frequency rates for mining in 
2016 are a factor of 3.95 lower than civil construction. Differences this substantial in 
injury frequency rates are a firm argument to improve the incident controls in the CCI, as 
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Figure 4.3: Annual injury frequency rates 
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The CCI is highly unstable in terms of the number of fatalities and fatality frequency 
rates, resulting in no clear fatality trends being identified over time. Mining as an industry 
has demonstrated that the control over fatalities can be improved. One such initiative to 
improve incident control is the Culture Transformation Framework (CTF) developed by 
the Mining Health and Safety Council (MHSC) (MHSC, 2014). Although not solely 
accountable, the impact of such initiative can clearly be seen in the reduction of the 
fatality frequency rates in the mining industry. The mining industry, proven by both 
fatality frequency rates and injury frequency rates, has become a safer working 
environment for employees.  
The fatality frequency rate was proven to be statistically insignificant for the 95% 
confidence interval, which means it provides little insight into future fatality frequency 
rates. The fluctuation of increase and decrease in the fatality frequency rate for CCI 
indicates that there is little control over the occurrence of incidents. The aim of this 
analysis, as illustrated by the mining industry statistics, is to create a ‘burning platform’ 
in the CCI to actively seek methods and adopt policies that will contribute to the reduction 
of injuries and fatalities. 
4.2.2. Mining industry effective incident control initiatives 
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 illustrated the incident trends for the civil construction and mining 
industries. Fatalities in the CCI have shown no trend in growth or decay, whereas the 
mining industry has seen a reduction. The mining industry-wide initiatives have proven 
to be successful in the reduction of fatalities and injuries. Sections 2.2 gives brief details 
on known CCI-wide methods to control the occurrence of incidents. 
The initiative applied in the mining industry to be focused on is the CTF. The CTF is 
chosen as available recorded mining incident trends demonstrate the positive role the CTF 
has played on the annual incident frequency rates for the mining industry (Department of 
Mineral Resources South Africa, 2018). The CTF was only developed in 2008, however 
incident reduction is seen from 2007 to 2008 and therefore cannot be glorified as the only 
means of incident reduction (MHSC, 2011). Focus is still given to the CTF as it played a 
role in further incident reduction from 2008 to 2016. Sustainable incident reduction is 
crucial to ensure favourable incident trends in the future.  
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The MHSC states that the CTF has a key focus of controlling risks at the source (MHSC, 
2011), identifying how this framework is essential in preventing incidents. To understand 
how the CTF has made positive contributions it must be understood what makes up the 
CTF.   
The CTF comprises of 11 pillars, each of which represents a different aspect of incident 
control. For the purpose of this study, the first six pillars are focused on, as the remaining 
pillars are only to be implemented after the year 2020 and are thus not relevant in the 
analysis. Brief descriptions of each of the six pillars under consideration are as follows 
(MHSC, 2011): 
1. Bonuses and performance incentives: Zero harm to employees is the main 
priority, ahead of production and profit. 
2. Risk management: Finding the source of potential risks, thereafter, managing 
future risks at the source. 
3. Leadership: Encouraging leaders, workplace and organisational level employees, 
to lead by example in terms of promoting zero harm initiatives. 
4. Leading practice: Find which OHS practices and approaches are successful and 
adopt these into the CTF. 
5. Diversity management: No racism, genderism or any other form of 
discrimination.  
6. Data management: Monitor and evaluate mine health and safety performance as 
well as the progress of the CTF implementation. 
The CTF prioritises the safety of employees by focusing on the removal of risk, thereby 
creating a safer work environment. Reduction in risk is achievable through using the CTF 
to identify and control hazards which are present within the workplace. Understanding of 
the hazards allows for the correct selection of controls to be set in place. Both the CCI 
and mining industry have similar hazards which suggests that they should have similar 
level of controls in place (Tobergte and Curtis, 2013). 
According to members of various South African civil construction companies there is a 
focus on the reduction of incidents occurring. However, the fact remains that according 
to the FEM statistics regarding the CCI, the industry has been unsuccessful in controlling 
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the occurrence of fatalities and there is a large injury frequency rate. A possible reason 
behind the initiatives not being successful is the CCI focusing on incidents in isolation. 
This study focuses on incidents as a collective, providing a cross-sectional view of 
incidents. The adapted ICF is used to analyse multiple incidents across three South 
African civil construction companies. The analysis of multiple incidents provides 
findings regarding the leading incident causation factors and relationships between the 
incident causation factors. Findings regarding these incident causation factors allows for 
the understanding of controls which need to be improved or put in place to prevent an 
uncontrolled energy release. 
4.2.3. Potential improvements made by this study in understanding incident 
causation 
The ICF developed by Jude Bonsu has been constructed to simplify incident causation 
compared to other ICFs (Bonsu et al., 2016). The adapted ICF is able to account for many 
factors considered in the occurrence of incidents. The improvement this study has made 
compared to previous incident investigations is due to the approach it has taken in 
applying the adapted ICF across multiple incidents. 
This study’s analysis process allows for the cross-sectional view of multiple incidents, 
removing the focus from viewing incidents as singular events. The adapted ICF is used 
to analyse 66 incidents which have occurred across three South African civil construction 
companies. This analysis gives insight into the leading incident causation factors (human 
errors, workplace factors and organisational factors), as well as revealing relationships 
between the different incident causation factors. Findings regarding these incident 
causation factors allows for the understanding of controls which need to be improved or 
put in place to prevent an uncontrolled energy release. 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the incident causation factors using the 66 incident 
reports analysed. The findings based in Chapter 5 demonstrate how the South African 
civil construction industry can improve its understanding of incidents, making incident 
reduction a more simplified task. To apply the ICF across multiple incidents a further 
understanding is required as to how to use this ICF. 
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4.3. Introduction to adapted South African civil 
construction incident causation framework 
Section 3.3 gave a brief outline of how the adapted ICF is applied in this study. To 
understand the application of the adapted ICF, the aspects analysed and identified within 
this ICF must be understood. Detailed discussion is given in this section regarding the 
aspects analysed using the adapted ICF. 
Uniform analysis is achieved by using only the adapted ICF in assessing incidents, 
providing a standardised method of assessing incidents. The ICF establishes each 
incident’s causation factor, thereafter, combining all the incident causation factors to 
create an incident causation database. 
4.3.1. Conceptualisation of framework 
Conceptualisation of the framework begins through the adaptation of Jude Bonsu’s 
mining ICF to suit the South African CCI (Bonsu et al., 2016). The civil construction ICF 
is used to indicate aspects which played a role in an incident occurring. 
Figure 4.4 provides a visual representation of how the ICF is applied to solving an 
incident. Each of the key aspects displayed in Figure 4.4 is discussed in Section 4.3.1.1 
to Section 4.3.1.6. The basis of Figure 4.4 is to develop the understanding that causation 
originates from organisational factors which subsequently lead to specific workplace 
factors which in turn lead to specific human errors. Once the final human error has 
occurred, if there is a lack of effective controls present, there is a loss of control of energy, 
resulting in an incident. The focus of the adapted ICF is determining the human errors, 
workplace factors and organisational factors which occurred, and in the process 
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Figure 4.4: Visual representation of the adapted ICF 















The South African civil construction ICF aims to investigate retrospectively from the 
human error to the organisational factors which lead to the incident occurring. The 
process of investigation begins through the establishment of the energy source or hazard 
involved in the incident. 
4.3.1.1. Establishing the hazard 
When an incident occurs there is an uncontrolled release of energy; hazards are the source 
of this uncontrolled energy. The understanding of hazards stems from the Energy Damage 
model, discussed in Section 2.4. Determining the hazard is a primary step in analysing 
the incident using the adapted ICF. 
Tracking the incident back from the event which occurred to the source of energy 
determines the hazard. The magnitude of the hazard’s energy is proportional to the harm 
caused when there is an uncontrolled release of this energy, unless a protective control is 
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set in place to protect the individual. Hazards are made up of various objects and can 
range from mechanical devices such as bulldozers to simple exposed flooring edges. For 
a hazard to result in an incident there was ineffective control of the energy. Effective 
energy control would not allow a release of uncontrolled energy.  
To prevent the uncontrolled release of energy or protect individuals from this energy, 
controls are to be set in place. Identifying the hazard is essential in ensuring the correct 
controls are in place. 
4.3.1.2. Establishing controls 
Controls discussed in this section correspond with the description given in Section 2.3. 
Failed controls are identified by establishing how the energy was able to escape 
(preventive control) or how the energy was able to cause harm once it escaped (protective 
control). Establishing that controls failed, resulting in an incident, indicates that controls 
must be improved to prevent incidents from occurring. Providing the understanding of 
what makes up both a preventive and protective control allows them to be identified in 
real-life incidents.  
Preventive controls revolve around the prevention of damage, whilst protective controls 
revolve around restricting the damage done. An incident occurring indicates that the 
preventive controls failed and there was a release of uncontrolled energy. Protective 
controls are established when individuals are harmed, either due to protective controls 
being ineffective or not having been put in place.  
Establishing both types of controls builds an understanding of the failures which resulted 
in the incident occurring. An incident occurs when there is an uncontrolled release of 
energy, however the three factors (human errors, workplace factors and organisational 
factors) lead to the uncontrolled release of energy. The first to be identified using the 
adapted ICF are human errors. 
4.3.1.3. Establishing human error 
To understand the identification process for determining the human error, reference is 
given to Appendix G1. For the correct application of Appendix G1 the user must first 
clearly distinguish the events which occurred and the controls which failed resulting in 
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the uncontrolled release of energy. Appendix G1 provides the process of identifying the 
human errors involved in the specific incident.  
Using Appendix G1 any of the following human errors are identified as causation factors 
for the specific incident: 
• Deviant violation -  A violation which does not commonly occur, practised 
   by very few individuals. 
• Routine violation -  A violation which commonly occurs, practised by  
   many individuals. 
• Mistake -   A gap in knowledge of the individual completing the 
   task is apparent, or insufficient skill to complete task. 
• Slip/Lapse -   Task carried out correctly, incident still occurs due to 
   design flaw, distraction or change in usual situation. 
• Latent failure -  No human error is present. 
The human errors have been discussed previously in Section 2.7, however, to identify the 
human errors involved in a specific incident focus is given to Appendix G1. Table 4.1 
provides a description of each step taken in Appendix G1 to identify the human errors 
involved in the incident. 
Table 4.1: Human error flowchart description 
Is there a Human error which occurred? 
(Description of active and latent failure is 
given in Section 2.9.4) 
1. Yes - Active failure states there was a 
human error which occurred.  
2. No – Latent Failure. Defined by the 
lack of human error. 
Was there intent in the action? 1. Yes – Intention clear. The individual 
involved in the incident purposely 
disobeyed set rules or procedures. 
2. No – Intention not clear. Individual 
was not purposely disobeying any 
rules or procedures. 
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Is this violation common practice? 
(Both described in Section 2.7) 
1. Yes - Routine Violation. Occurs as 
common practice by many 
individuals. 
2. No - Deviant Violation. Occurs 
infrequently, practised by very few 
individuals. 
Was there a lack of knowledge? 
(Section 2.7 describes each human error) 
1. Yes - Mistake. Gap in knowledge. 
Assumes can complete task, however, 
proven incorrect. 
2. No - Slip/Lapse. No gap in 
knowledge. Provided correct 
application, however, an error still 
occurred. 
 
Table 4.1 has described the process given in Appendix G1 for identifying the human 
errors involved in the incident. Identifying the human error over multiple incidents is the 
first step in determining the incident causation factors to be analysed. Identification of the 
workplace factors is the next step, as these factors led to the human errors occurring.   
4.3.1.4. Establishing workplace factor 
Descriptions regarding the different Workplace factors have been given in Chapter 2.8. 
The descriptions given in this section aim to apply the workplace factors to the CCI. Table 
4.2, gives definitions for the 4 workplace factors when applied to the civil construction 
ICF, very similar to those given in Section 2.8. 
Table 4.2: Workplace factors used in South African civil construction ICF 
Competent People (CP) Individuals performing the task have 
competence in doing so, with the correct skill 
levels. 
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Controlled Work Environment 
(CWE) 
Physical work environment ensures the 
workspace does not have physical conditions 
which could result in incidents.  
e.g. Workspace is overcrowded by individuals 
performing tasks. 
Behavioural work environment ensures that 
incorrect behaviour is not condoned in the 
workplace. 
e.g. Individuals ignore safety procedures set in 
place for the completion of a task. 
Safe Work Practices (SWP) There is a work procedure in place which 
provides adequate safety for the completion of 
the task. 
Understanding which workplace factors resulted in the incident occurring is established 
in Appendix G2. From Appendix G2 there may be multiple workplace factors which 
correspond to a singular human error. Identifying all workplace factors is vital, thus the 
questions in Appendix G2 do not rule out one workplace factor because another is chosen. 
Establishing the workplace factors which led to the human errors is accomplished 
through the data analysis of all the incidents. The next step in the determination of 
causation is then to establish the organisational factors which led to the specific 
workplace factor occurring.  
4.3.1.5. Establishing organisational factor 
The concept of organisational factors was previously discussed in Section 2.9.2. 
Organisational factors comprise of management systems set in place to restrict the 
possibility of an incident occurring. Flaws in the management systems create the 
organisational factors which lead to the workplace factors occurring. Organisational 
factors thus provide the first flaw within a system which leads to the uncontrolled release 
of energy. 
Many of the organisational factors used for the civil construction ICF were taken from 
Jude Bonsu’s Incident Causation Framework (Bonsu et al., 2016). To understand the 
organisational factors used for the adapted civil construction ICF definitions have been 
supplied in Table 4.2: 
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Table 4.3: Defined organisational factors for adapted civil construction ICF (Bonsu et al., 
2016) 
 
Organisational Factor Definition  
Auditing and Monitoring Lack of individuals constantly auditing and monitoring 
control systems to ensure that they are meeting the 
changing working environment and to ensure they are 
being adhered to. 
Communications Individuals performing the task do not understand 
correct safety protocol and do not communicate safety 
complaints to individuals in charge. 
Design Workplace or equipment is poorly designed and does not 
prioritise safety. 
Hazard Identification The hazard or magnitude of the hazard present has not 
been identified, therefore, controls set in place are non-
existent or ineffective in dealing with hazard’s energy. 
Leadership Deviant practices in the workplace are occurring due to 
inefficient supervision to correct behaviour. 
Learning from Incidents Lack of quality of investigations into previous incidents 
and relaying these findings to employees. 
Planned Maintenance Lack of regular equipment maintenance or substandard 
maintenance of equipment leading to failure. 
Procurement Incorrect or substandard equipment is purchased or 
necessary equipment has not been purchased. 
Risk Management  Not managing or dealing with identified risk through the 
use of effective risk control methods.  
 
Strategic Planning Organisation has prioritised specific goals over the safety 
requirements for employees. 
Task Design Task instructions have not identified all risks, in failing 
to do so insufficient risk control methods are present. 
Training and Competence Workers do not have the correct skill to complete a task 
or their competence was not checked before the 
completion of the task. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 80  
 
Multiple organisational factors may result in a specific workplace factor occurring. For 
the purpose of determining all relevant organisational factors, a checklist has been 
established for deciding which organisational factors resulted in the identified workplace 
factor occurring. The checklist used for identifying the relevant organisational factors is 
given in Appendix G3, ensuring that the adapted ICF identifies all organisational factors 
involved.  
After analysing each of the 66 singular incident reports using the adapted ICF, trends in 
incident causation may be found by viewing the multiple incidents as a whole. The 
findings will focus on the proportional contributions of each incident causation factor as 
well as developing links as to the workplace factors that caused the specific human errors 
and the organisational factors which caused the specific workplace factors. 
To better understand the ICF used it is vital to see an example of analysis. The analysis 
combines the assessment of all the aforementioned data.  
4.3.1.6. Example of incident analysis 
To demonstrate how the adapted ICF is applied, the analysis of the incident report given 
in Appendix D1 is explained. Appendix D1 is an incident report received from Company 
1. All three companies’ incident reports provide the same details regarding the incident. 
The analysis of this incident report demonstrates to the reader the analysis process used 
when applying the adapted ICF to a singular incident. 
The analysis of applying the adapted ICF to an incident report follows the steps given in 
Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. The analysis seen in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 is extracted from 
the database of all analysed incident reports, thus each incident followed the same steps 
for analysis as displayed. 
Steps 1 to 6 shown in Figure 4.5 look at the administrative details taken from the incident 
report. Administration detail is information regarding case number, date and time, day of 
the week, time of the day, type of incident and the location of the incident. This 
information is given to provide the context as to when the incident occurred and the 
severity. Step 7 summarises the events that led to the incident occurring, helping to 
identify the hazards which released energy and the controls which failed. Each of the 
steps demonstrated in Figure 4.5 forms the basis of understanding the conditions which 
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led to the incident occurring. This basis of understanding leads to further steps in 












Figure 4.6 shows steps 8 to 12 which identify the proximal causes of the incident 
occurring. The source of energy, the hazard, is identified in step 8. Identification of the 
hazard shows where the energy release originated from, this can lead to step 9, the 
identification of the controls which failed or should have been in place to control the 
energy. Description is given in step 9 as to why the control failed, whilst step 10 discusses 
whether the identified control was preventive or protective in nature. Identifying the 
controls shows where the organisation did not implement effective methods in controlling 
the hazard. 
Step 11 identifies the human errors which led to the control failing and the incident 
occurring. The method to determine the relevant human errors is given in Appendix G1 
as discussed in Section 4.3.1.3.  Identification of the human errors determines the final 
factor responsible for the incident occurring, the reasoning for each human error 
identified is given in step 12. The remaining factors are to be established in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.5: Analysis of company 1, case 3 (a) 
3 02-Dec-2018
00h20
Saturday Evening Serious Injury N2 on ramp from the airport 
(West) and Bellville (East) 
towards R300.
Car collided with 
worker painting 
road
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Saturday Evening Serious Injury
Case Date and 
Time
Day Time of Day Incident Type Location What happened
Step 1: Identify 
case number as 
reference. 
Step 2: Record 
time and date of 
incident. 
Step 3: Identify 




Step 5: Categorise 
the injury obtained as 
either Fatal, Serious 
Injury, Lost Time 
Injury or Near Miss. 
Step 7: Describe the 
events which 
occurred at the time 
of the incident. 
Step 4: Categorise the 
time of day as Morning, 
Afternoon or Evening. 
Step 6: Identify the 
location where the 
incident occurred.  
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Figure 4.7 shows how the adapted ICF identifies the workplace factors which caused the 
relevant human error (step 13) using the method given in Appendix G2. When the 
workplace factor identified is CWE, step 14 identifies whether this is due to the physical 
or behavioural work environment and is repeated for all instances of CWE. Step 15 
provides the reasoning as to which workplace factors occurred for the specific human 
errors. Steps 13 and 15 are repeated to establish all workplace factors as these may be 
multiple for each human error identified.  
Step 16 uses the checklist given in Appendix G3 to identify the organisational factors 
which caused the relevant workplace factor. Reasoning for each organisational factor is 
given in step 17. Steps 16 and 17 are repeated for the entirety of Appendix G3 to identify 
all organisational factors responsible for the relevant workplace factor. 
Hazard Description of failed or 
not in place control
Control which failed Human 
Error I
Reasoning Human Error II Reasoning
Car Inneficient delineators, 
cones not visible at 
night
Preventative Mistake Used equipment 
which was 
innefficient for task
Mistake Wrong equipment used
Mistake
Inneficient delineators, 
cones not visible at 
night
Mistake Wrong equipment used
Mistake
Inneficient delineators, 
cones not visible at 
night
Mistake Wrong equipment used
Inneficient speed 
control







Lack of physical barrier Protective Mistake Did not think to 
provide physical 
barrier
Mistake Did not think to provide 
physical barrier
Mistake Did not think to provide 
physical barrier
Mistake Did not think to provide 
physical barrier
Companies failing to 
work together, leading 
to poor planning
Preventative Latent No human error Latent Management Decision
Latent Management Decision
Latent Management Decision
Step 8: Identify 
the hazard which 
was the source of 
damaging energy. 
Step 11: Using the system in 
Appendix G1 decide which 
human error resulted in the 
incident. 
Step 9: Discuss the 
control which failed or 
should have been in 
place. 
Step 12: Provide 
reasoning for the 
human error chosen. 
Step 10: Identify if the 
control discussed is 
protective or preventive. 
Figure 4.6: Analysis of company 1, case 3 (b) 
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All 66 incident reports are analysed using the adapted ICF. All analysed incident reports 
form the database from which the analysis is done for the incident causation factors. 
Grouping the individual incident analyses into a database allows a cross-sectional 
analysis of incident causation. The cross-sectional analysis gives insight as to the leading 
incident causation factors and builds relationships between these factors. The analysis of 
the incident causation factors is given in Section 5. 
4.4. Chapter 4 summary 
Chapter 4 set out to motivate the South African civil construction industries’ requirement 
for this study using the adapted ICF and to describe all the aspects to understand the use 
of the adapted ICF. Section 4.2 covered aspects which motivated the study and Section 
Figure 4.7: Analysis of company 1, case 3 (c) 
FFPE Inefficient equipment used FFPE Procurement Incorrect equipment 
supplied
FFPE Leadership Not following safety 
protocol
CWE Physical Site did not prvent the 
insufficient equipment 
used
Physical CWE Auditing and 
Monitoring
No management made 
note of lack of equipment 
on site
Physical CWE
CP Individuals should know 
equipment not efficient at 
night
CP Risk Management Innefective risk control 
methods being used
FFPE Traffic control uses 
inneficient equipment
FFPE Procurement Need increased safety 
equipment
FFPE Auditing and 
Monitoring
Controls not to safety 
standard
SWP Speed control not 
controlled




Do not have effective 
controls for hazard 
magnitude
CWE Physical No physical defense Physical CWE Design workplace does not 
account for safety
No physical defense Physical CWE Hazard 
Identification
Not realising danger of 
traffic flow
FFPE Use superior equipment FFPE Procurement Inneficient defense 
barriers
CWE Behavioural Inneficient control over 
workers on task
Behavioural CWE Communication Not handling of project
Behavioural CWE Leadership Not dealing with 
animosity
Behavioural CWE Auditing and 
Monitoring
Should be dealt with 
before more issues occur.
Step 15: Provide 
reasoning to the 
choice of 
Workplace Factor. 
Step 13: Identify 
Workplace Factors 
using the analysis 
method in Appendix 
G2. 






Physical or behavioural (CWE 
only)
Reasoning Physical or behavioural (CWE 
only) II
Workplace factors II Organizational 
factors
Reasoning
Step 14: Discuss 
whether CWE is 
either Physical or 
Behavioural 
Step 16: Provide the 
choice of Organisational 
Factor based on the 
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4.3 described the adapted ICF. A means to control and reduce the occurrence of incidents 
in the South African civil construction industry was proven to be required through the 
comparison with the South African mining industry in Section 4.2.1. This demonstrated 
that the mining industry has greatly reduced the occurrence of fatalities and fatality 
frequency rates, whilst the civil construction industry has statistically insignificant results 
in this regard. The injury frequency rates demonstrated the very high frequency rates 
occurring in civil construction; however, there seems to a be a reduction taking place. 
Section 4.2.2 provides means that the mining industry has applied in receiving such 
positive results in incident reduction. This leads to Section 4.2.3 which aims to provide 
the civil construction industry with its own means of understanding and reducing 
incidents. It describes how this study could benefit the civil construction industry in this 
regard through the development of understanding incident causation across multiple 
incidents, finding relationships between incident causation factors and the leading 
incident causations. Section 4.3 finally described all the aspects used in the adapted ICF 
and how to apply this ICF to an incident report. The reader will have gained valuable 
understanding of how the ICF is used for this study.   
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Chapter 5.  
Data analysis and results 
5.1. Introduction 
Analysis of the 66 incident reports using the civil construction-adapted ICF creates a 
database made up of all the incident causation factors which contributed to the incidents. 
Once the database is populated, graphs are used to compile a cross-sectional analysis of 
incidents. The cross-sectional analysis views all 66 incidents (5 fatalities, 27 lost-time 
injuries, 8 serious injuries and 26 near-miss incidents) as a database which represents the 
South African civil construction industry, as opposed to viewing each as individual 
events. The cross-sectional analysis provides an insight into the leading incident causation 
factors, as well as relationships between the incident causation factors. The database 
comprises of 191 human errors, 284 workplace factors and 485 organisational factors 
for the 66 incidents.  
Analysis of incident causation factors reveals the primary human errors, workplace 
factors and organisational factors causing incidents. Once the primary human errors, 
workplace factors and organisational factors are identified, it is a simpler process to 
reduce the occurrence of incidents due to these factors. Determining relationships 
between the incident causation factors identifies the type of workplace factors which 
cause the specific human error, thereafter, the type of organisational factors which cause 
the specific workplace factor. By improving the specific organisational factors, linked 
workplace factors will reduce and subsequently the linked human errors. 
The information provided in Section 4.2 motivates the requirement for a means to better 
understand incident causation for the South African civil construction industry. The data 
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5.2. Data assessment 
To understand the analysis of incident causations, each of the three companies is initially 
assessed individually to demonstrate similar results across them; the reasoning for this is 
motivated in Section 4.2.3. Tables 5.1 to 5.3 describe the different aspects highlighted in 
the analysis for each of the three factors (human errors, workplace factors and 
organisational factors), briefly discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
The primary analysis of human error is the proportional analysis, whereby the total 
human error is demonstrated as the proportional contribution made by each human error 
type. Table 5.1 demonstrates the two other parameters from which human error is 
assessed. These two parameters aim to demonstrate the frame of mind of individuals 
performing a task at the time of the human error. 
Table 5.1: Human errors analysis parameters 
Time that Injury Occurred 1. Morning: 
From 04:00 to 11:59. 
2. Afternoon: 
From 12:00 to 19:59 







The analysis of workplace factors begins with the proportional analysis, separating each 
workplace factor into its contribution to the total number of workplace factors. After the 
proportional analysis, the workplace factors are assessed according to their proportional 
contribution in causing each type of human error. Table 5.2 represents these parameters 
as the workplace factors are assessed according to each type of human error. 
Relationships are provided through this proportional analysis which depicts the 
workplace factors which commonly cause the specific human error. The relationships 
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providing links between human errors and workplace factors give insight into the flow 
of energy resulting in the occurrence of incidents. 
Table 5.2: Workplace factors analysis parameters 
Human error  1. Latent (No human error) 
2. Mistake 
3. Slip and lapse 
4. Routine violation 
5. Deviant violation 
Organisational factors are the last factor analysed and are the first factor to lead to the 
flow of uncontrolled energy. This relationship was demonstrated previously in Figure 4.4. 
The proportional analysis for this factor separates each organisational factor into its 
proportional contribution to the total number of organisational factors.  
After the proportional analysis, relationships are given for the proportional contribution 
of organisational factors which caused the specific workplace factors. These 
relationships provide insight as to which organisational factors are most commonly 
responsible for causing the specific workplace factors. Table 5.3 provides the parameters 
of the study of organisational factors as the respective workplace factors with which 
relationships are developed. The link between the organisational factors which caused 
the specific workplace factors provides further insight into the energy flow which led to 
the human error and eventually the incident occurring. 
Table 5.3: Organisational factors analysis  
Workplace factors 1. CP (Competent People) 
2. CWE (Controlled Work Environment) 
• Physical work environment 
• Behavioural work environment 
3. FFPE (Fit for Purpose Equipment) 
4. SWP (Safe Work Practice) 
Understanding the leading incident causation factors and relationships between incident 
causation factors, builds a greater level of understanding of the energy flow pathway. This 
flow of energy is the cause of incidents when controls have failed, or when controls 
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become inadequate to contain an increased magnitude of energy. Greater understanding 
of energy flow means that incident causation can be dealt with at the source, resulting in 
the prevention of future incidents. Section 5.3 provides insight into all factors involved 
in incident causation for the assessed incident reports. 
5.3. Causation trends 
5.3.1. Human error causation trends 
Section 5.3.1.1 gives the proportional analysis of the 191 human errors across the 66 
incident reports provided by the three companies. The proportional analysis of human 
error is shown for each company individually, after which an analysis is given working 
with a weighted average of all three companies. The weighted average ensures that data 
from each company counts equally when combining all the data. Section 5.3.1.2 gives the 
analysis of human error based on when the incident occurred, firstly in terms of the time 
of day and then in terms of the day of the week. 
5.3.1.1. Human error proportions 
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 display the proportional analysis of the human errors for each 
individual company, whilst Figure 5.4 displays the proportional analysis of the human 
errors as a weighted average across all three companies. The weighted average of human 
errors is calculated using Equation 5.1:  
𝐻𝐸 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (%) 
= (
(∑ 𝐻𝐸𝑥,𝐶1×𝐼𝐶1)+(∑ 𝐻𝐸𝑥,𝐶2×𝐼𝐶2)+(∑ 𝐻𝐸𝑥,𝐶3×𝐼𝐶3)
𝐼𝐶1+𝐼𝐶2+𝐼𝐶3
) × 100                        (5.1) 
Where: 
𝑥 ∈ {𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒, 𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑝 & 𝐿𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡} 
𝐻𝐸  –  Proportion of Specific human error  
I  –  Count of incidents 
C1 –  Company 1 
C2  –  Company 2 
C3 –  Company 3 
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The data associated with Figures 5.1 to 5.4 is given in Appendix H1. The following values 
are used for the weighted average in the analysis: 
𝐼𝐶1 -  8 
𝐼𝐶2 –  25 



























Latent Mistake Routine Violation Slip & Lapse
Figure 5.1: Human errors proportional 
contribution company 1 
Figure 5.2: Human errors proportional 
contribution company 2 
Figure 5.4: Human errors proportional 
contribution weighted average  
Figure 5.3: Human errors proportional 










Latent Mistake Routine Violation Slip & Lapse
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 90  
 
As evidenced through the data of all three companies and the weighted average of this 
data, the leading human error is the factor ‘mistakes’. For each company demonstrated 
in Figures 5.1 to 5.3 mistakes contribute a range of 45.00% to 54.32% of the total human 
error and carry a weighted average across the three companies of 50.67%. For all three 
companies the human error rankings remain constant, as each company’s next leading 
contributor to human error is slip and lapse, then routine violation and lastly latent error. 
Thus the same rankings occur for the weighted average of each human error’s 
proportional contribution to the total number of human errors. 
As the leading contribution to human error, mistakes occur due to the lack of adequate 
knowledge for the completion of a task which when applied, results in an incident 
occurring (Bonsu et al., 2016). Individuals who have the correct knowledge for the 
completion of a task should be able to perform the task without direct supervision, and 
provided that these individuals perform tasks in the correct manner, no violations occur. 
This means that with the correct management systems in place, all individuals performing 
tasks are ensured to have the required skill and execute tasks accordingly. 
Figure 5.4 shows that slips and lapses contribute less than mistakes to the total human 
error, with a weighted average contribution of 23.33%. Slip and lapse are not related to 
a flaw in the individual committing the human error or to any sort of deliberate violations 
but rather a flaw in management systems. This is due to slips and lapses occurring from 
design flaws or from a change in the design that the individual performing the task was 
unaware of. The individual involved in a slip and lapse has the required knowledge to 
perform a task, but an incident occurs due to operational decision-making (discussed in 
Section 2.6). Operational decision-making often occurs when individuals are performing 
repetitive tasks and there is a variation in the task or the equipment deviates from what 
the individual is used to (Joy, 2000). If the individual does not account for this, the human 
error occurs. A possible means to overcome slips and lapses is the introduction of 
controls which activate an individual’s cognitive thought process. Such controls are 
things such as systems that require a manual override before a process can continue. 
Alternatively, the designs of tasks and equipment must be standardised. 
The third largest contributor to human error is routine violations, with a proportional 
contribution of 18.86% to the weighted average. A routine violation implies that 
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procedures were purposely not followed by the individual in the completion of a task and 
others are doing it as well. Many of the incident reports assessed found a link between a 
lack of supervision and the occurrence of routine violations. Lack of supervision creates 
a work environment where employees perform tasks in a manner they see fit. Supervision 
is not an ideal means to reduce the occurrence of routine violations as increased 
supervision does not account for a resilient system. The source of the routine violation 
needs to be identified in order to create a system which is free of routine violation when 
supervision is not present. It may be noted that the incidents assessed are free of any 
deviant violations. Routine violations begin with a singular deviant violation which is 
then repeated by fellow employees.  
Latent failure is an incident where there was an absence of human error by the individual 
involved. For data display purposes, the proportional contribution was given as if latent 
error is a form of human error. The lowest contribution to the total number of human 
errors was made by latent error, with a weighted average of 7.14%. Latent errors involve 
incidents where the organisational and workplace factors make up the entirety of the 
failure pathway. In order to deal with latent errors, flaws within the system need to be 
dealt with at a workplace and organisational factor level. 
The proportional contribution of the types of human errors across the three companies 
remained remarkably consistent in terms of the relative contribution. The study found that 
across the three companies mistakes are the leading cause of incidents in the South 
African civil construction industry (CCI), which could indicate a general trend for the 
South African civil construction industry. 
For a deeper insight into an individual’s mindset when specific human errors occur, 
research was done into the time of day as well as the day of week the incidents occur. 
5.3.1.2. Time and day of human error 
In Section 5.3.1.2 analyses are given on the relationship between when (time of day and 
day of week) the incident occurred and the associated human errors. The time of day 
(Figure 5.5) and day of week (Figure 5.6) analyses provide information regarding the 
occurrence of specific human errors and are not considered for the relationship between 
human errors, workplace factors and organisational factors.  
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Appendix H2 provides the data points regarding the time of day the specific human error 
occurred. The day is split into morning and afternoon as 64 of the incidents (96.97%) 
occurred between 06:00 and 18:00, thus the data outside these times is statistically 
insignificant. As shown in Figure 5.5, the proportional contribution of human errors 
occurring in the morning and afternoon are very similar. There is, however, a difference 
with routine violations occurring more commonly in the afternoon, whilst slips and lapses 
occur more commonly in the mornings. As time progresses within the day individuals 
may be more prone to complete tasks in the quickest means possible, indicating the 
occurrence of high routine violations. Morning work routines association with slips and 
lapses show individuals are in operational decision-making mode in the mornings. Being 
tired could lead to operational decision-making and resulting in a slip and lapse occurring. 




































Figure 5.5: Time of day and associated human error 
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According to the South African labour guide individuals work a maximum of 45 hours 
per week (9 hours per day), therefore, for this analysis it is assumed that individuals 
working on a Sunday are working overtime (Erasmus and Toit, 2018). Appendix H3 
demonstrates the data points used in Figure 5.6 for the days on which specific human 
errors occurred. Appendix H4 provides the number of each human error per day of the 
week, associated with the total proportions. 
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that each day of the week there are slight fluctuations with the 
human errors’ proportional contributions. On Tuesdays (26.19%), Wednesdays (32.43%) 
and Thursdays (27.78%) there are relatively large proportions of slip and lapse compared 
to the rest of the days of the week. Viewing Appendix H4 supports this, as a large number 
of slips and lapses occur on these three days. It may be possible that individuals have re-
entered the operational decision-making process for the week, as cognitive thinking is 
performed on the first day of the week due to a break from the task. The operational 
decision-making is possibly caused by mid-week exhaustion which led to the individual 
possibly not taking note of deviations in the system which could lead to incidents.  
Fridays (61.90%) and Sundays (70.00%) hold a large proportion of mistakes compared to 
the rest of the week. As Friday is the last day of a normal workweek and Sunday is 
considered overtime, individuals aim to finish work as quickly as possible. Individuals 
then perform tasks in a manner they think is effective and do tasks that they are not meant 
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to be doing in order to complete them quicker, while thinking that is safe to do so. The 
executed plan fails, leading to an incident as the result of the individual’s mistake. 
The time of day and day of week analyses combined provide insight into psychological 
factors which contribute to human errors occurring. The time of day analysis showed the 
variations in time of day and the occurrence of routine violations and slips and lapses. 
The day of the week did provide a possible link between slips and lapses and mid-week 
exhaustion, as well as mistakes with a rushed process by individuals involved in the task. 
The establishment of proportional contributions of human error gives a better 
understanding of the human errors involved in an incident. This understanding of human 
errors helps to better understand the relationships between human errors and workplace 
factors which are developed in Section 5.3.2.2. Through the establishment of 
relationships between workplace factors and human errors a better understanding is 
gained of the control failures that lead to the flow of energy in the failure pathway. 
5.3.2. Workplace factors causation trends 
Workplace factors’ causation trends are discussed in this section where 284 workplace 
factors are analysed. Section 5.3.2.1 provides the proportional contribution made by each 
workplace factor to the total number of workplace factors. Once the proportion of 
workplace factors is established, a relationship is found between the workplace factors 
and human errors discussed in Section 5.3.2.2. 
5.3.2.1. Workplace factors proportions 
Figures 5.7 to 5.9 display the proportion each workplace factor contributes to the total 
number of workplace factors for the three companies, whilst the weighted average 
proportional contribution across all three companies is provided in Figure 5.10. The 
workplace factors used are those discussed in Section 4.3.1.4. 
The weighted average for workplace factors is calculated using Equation 5.2: 
𝑊𝐹𝑥 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (%) 
= (
(∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑥,𝐶1×𝐻𝐸𝑥,𝐶1)+(∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑥,𝐶2×𝐻𝐸𝐶2)+(∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑥,𝐶3×𝐻𝐸𝐶3)
𝐻𝐸𝐶1+𝐻𝐸𝐶2+𝐻𝐸𝐶3
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𝑥 ∈ {𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸, 𝐶𝑃, 𝐶𝑊𝐸, 𝑆𝑊𝑃} 
Workplace factor – Count of Specific workplace factor 
𝐻𝐸 – Count of human error 
C1 – Company 1 
C2 – Company 2 
C3 – Company 3 
For Equation 5.2 the proportional workplace factors were taken from Appendix I1 and 
the following values were used for the human error count: 
𝐻𝐸𝐶1  –  30 
𝐻𝐸𝐶2  –  80 
















Figure 5.8: Workplace factors proportional 
contribution company 2 
 
Figure 5.7: Workplace factors proportional 
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Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show that the largest proportional contribution of workplace 
factors for all three companies is CWE, contributing between 37.50% (Figure 5.8) and 
42.19% (Figure 5.9) of the total number of workplace factors. CWE was also found to 
occur in 56 of the 66 incident reports assessed. Each of the three companies assessed has 
their own safety systems set in place, however, these findings demonstrate that all three 
safety systems are most vulnerable to these specific workplace factors. When viewing the 
data from a South African civil construction industry wide perspective (see Figure 5.10), 
the weighted average demonstrates CWE is again the largest contributing workplace 
factor (39.66%). The two aspects which contribute to CWE-related incidents are the 
physical (48.67%) and behavioural (51.33%) working environment, as shown in 
Appendix I2. CWE in terms of the physical environment in many of the assessed incidents 
consisted of restricted workspaces and inefficient control of hazards present. The 
behavioural aspects involved scenarios where individuals were not following the correct 
safety procedure, and this was not identified and/or corrected by the relevant supervisors.  
Figure 5.10 indicates that the second largest proportional contribution of workplace 
factors is SWP (29.15%). The high proportion of SWP suggests that work was completed 
either without procedures or with procedures that did not adequately account for the 
Figure 5.10: Workplace factors 
proportional contribution weighted average  
Figure 5.9: Workplace factors proportional 
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control of energy and thereby the safety of employees. The procedure dictates the way in 
which individuals handle the energy present within the system. Inefficient controls along 
with procedures which do not effectively account for these controls allows the 
uncontrolled release of energy, resulting in an incident. Work procedures need to be 
designed and implemented with employee safety as the leading consideration, above that 
of production, as commonly practiced in the civil construction industry (Kines et al., 
2010). 
The third-largest proportional contribution to workplace factors is FFPE. The weighted 
average across all three companies (Figure 5.10) indicates that 20.16% of all workplace 
factors are due to FFPE. In many of the incident reports analysed inadequate equipment 
or equipment not fit for the intended purpose was used. If correct and efficient equipment 
were used the likelihood of an incident would decrease. When taking into consideration 
the design of a task, the correct equipment of an adequate standard to complete the task 
should be specified. Equipment should be regularly maintained ensuring that no sub-
standard equipment is used. Substandard equipment increases the possibility of a 
mechanical failure resulting in the uncontrolled release of energy.  
CP makes the smallest proportional contribution to workplace factors with between 
7.50% (Figure 5.8) and 14.06% (Figure 5.9) across the three companies and a weighted 
average contribution of 11.03% (Figure 5.10). CP focuses on whether correctly skilled 
individuals were allocated a task they were competent in completing. Competent 
individuals can still perform tasks which result in mistakes; this involves competent 
individuals completing a task with a gap in judgement over the method to complete the 
task. For example, in many of the assessed incident reports individuals stood behind 
operating machinery which resulted in a mistake, this is a gap in judgement and has no 
reflection on an individual’s competence in completing the task they were performing. 
By implication of CP being the lowest contributing workplace factor, it is demonstrated 
that training will not result in the reduction of workplace factors, however, many incident 
reports assessed requested training and discipline as the required corrective action. 
Training will only be effective in reducing CP, therefore, in reducing 11.03% of incidents. 
This demonstrates that according to the incident reports assessed, the three companies’ 
methods to prevent or reduce future incidents focus on a method that is only effective on 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 98  
 
11.03% of the workplace factors occurring. The workplace factor which in fact requires 
the most attention is that of CWE not CP. 
When workplace factors are understood, relationships can be developed with human 
errors. Establishing relationships between workplace factors which caused specific 
human errors creates the possibility of reducing specific human errors through the 
reduction of a specific workplace factor. 
5.3.2.2. Relationships between human errors and workplace factors 
Multiple workplace factors often lead to the occurrence of a single human error (Bonsu 
et al., 2016). Figures 5.11 to 5.14 show which workplace factors contributed to the 
specific human errors occurring. The contributions of workplace factors are given for 
each of the three companies (Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13) and as a weighted average 
(Figure 5.14). The data associated with Figures 5.11 to 5.14 is given in Appendix I3. 
As demonstrated in Figure 5.4, 50.67% of all human errors are mistakes. Figure 5.11 









The largest contributing workplace factor to mistakes is CWE, contributing between 
32.26% and 35.48% across the three companies, with a weighted average of 33.81%. The 
CWE-related incidents assessed were categorised as either due to the physical or 
behavioural work environment. 
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For many of the assessed incidents occurring due to the physical work environment it is 
found that effective controls were not in place to prevent the release of uncontrolled 
energy, and this was not picked up by the supervisory layer responsible to control the 
work environment. The behavioural aspect found that workers were possibly unaware 
that they were not following the correct work procedure and they were not restricted in 
proceeding with unsafe behaviour. Appendix I2 demonstrates that physical environment 
and behavioural environment for mistakes make up 57.69% and 42.31% of CWE 
respectively. 
SWP contributes between 22.58% and 32.73% to mistakes across the three companies, 
with a weighted average contribution of 27.90%. SWP requires that there were procedures 
in place for the completion of a task and that these procedures adequately identify the 
hazards present during the task, well as the controls that should be in place to prevent the 
uncontrolled release of the underlying energy. In these instances, mistakes occur because 
work procedures are absent or do not offer the individual a safe method of performing the 
task (i.e. The procedure is incorrect). In addition, changes in the environment could result 
in a normally adequate procedure to become inadequate due to a change in the magnitude 
of the underlying energy. 
FFPE contributes between 17.74% and 25.81% to mistakes, with a weighted average of 
19.97%. FFPE relates to the use of equipment which is not fit for purpose either by being 
the wrong tool for the job or by being of substandard quality to perform the job safely. 
Individuals will use equipment that they think is correct; however, this equipment is not 
always correct for the completion of the specific task.  
The lowest workplace factor contributing to mistakes is CP, at a weighted average of 
18.33%. CP describes the competency of individuals being inadequate for the task that 
they are required to perform. Of the incidents assessed where CP led to mistakes 
occurring, a large number occurred due to individuals not being verified as competent in 
















Slip and lapse describes a situation where there is a design flaw or change in the task 
design which the worker is unaware of. The result of this is the worker performing a task 
as normal, however, a human error results due to the design flaw or change in the task 
design.  
As shown in Figure 5.12, CWE and SWP are the leading contributors to this form of 
human error, with weighted averages of 37.30% and 34.69% respectively. As seen in 
Appendix I2, the CWE-related slips and lapses are broken up into 40% behavioural and 
60% physical working environment. The behavioural aspects primarily occurred due to 
operational decision making, in which individuals often attempt to complete a task in 
‘'autopilot’ and thereby not accounting for additional factors and/or changes around them. 
The physical environment in many cases revolved around ineffective controls in the form 
of warning systems. A common error in the physical work environment was controls such 
as warning signals that could not effectively control individual’s actions around hazards. 
SWP accounts for slip and lapse incidents where there was no procedure or the procedure 
did not account for changes in the task design which led to a slip and lapse-related 
incident. When a task design changes, SWP should ensure that the workers are aware of 
the deviations which they must account for and provide guidance on what to do if it is not 
safe to continue with the task. 
FFPE contributes 22.71% to slips and lapse-related human errors. Slips and lapses 












Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Weighted Average
CWE SWP FFPE CP
Figure 5.12: Slip and lapse and associated workplace factors 
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performing the same task; however, small variations in equipment led to incidents. Small 
variations include equipment which individuals were not used to using. The variation in 
equipment often resulted in the equipment not being fit for purpose. The individual 
performs the task in operational decision-making mode, not realising the change in the 
equipment, resulting in an incident.  
Only 5.30% of all slip and lapse-type errors were contributed by CP. This contribution 
occurred when individuals were placed on tasks where they were not made aware of 
design changes and did not have the required skill set to perform the task safely with the 
slight variations. 
Routine violations result in an individual performing a task in a manner which is 
commonly practised but directly disobeys procedures or rules set out. It is evident in 
Figure 5.13 that CWE makes a contribution of 55.50% to routine violations. According 
to the incident reports this is primarily made up of behavioural environment (83.33%), as 
seen in Appendix I2. The behavioural work environment makes a very large contribution 
to routine violations, as the violation is not identified and/or corrected by supervisory or 
management individuals. Individuals performing the task continue to do so in a manner 
of their own choosing, often not according to safety procedures, resulting in an incident. 
Pete Kinas (2010), found that an increase in verbal safety communication by supervisors 
resulted in a significantly increased level of safety on the construction site (Kines et al., 
2010). Improvement of the behavioural work environment can be effected through verbal 



















Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Weighted Average
CWE SWP CP FFPE
Figure 5.13: Routine violations and associated workplace factors 
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The second-largest workplace factor is SWP, which contributes 19.15%. The connection 
between SWP and routine violations is related to instances where the work procedure did 
not effectively cover all aspects of the task. Individuals potentially disobeyed the 
procedure to perform a task in a manner they thought was more effective. SWP should 
ensure that workers do not purposely stray from procedures due to the procedure not being 
detailed sufficiently. 
CP and FFPE make up the remaining 25.35% of routine violations, with a weighted 
average of 13.04% and 12.31% respectively. The connection between CP and routine 
violations is when individuals purposely disobey procedures because they are 
incompetent in performing the task. FFPE involves instances where individuals are using 
equipment that was not prescribed but they think is more efficient for the task. This proves 
to be incorrect as in many incidents the equipment chosen is not fit for purpose. 
Figure 5.14 displays the proportional contribution of workplace factors involved in latent 
error. As it has been established in the definition of a latent error, these workplace factors 
have no associated human error. Figure 5.14 demonstrates FFPE has a strong relationship 
with latent error with a 58.50% contribution to the weighted average. The high 
association with FFPE in the case of latent error involved more incidents of equipment 
which failed than equipment not suited to the purpose of the task. This is clear as latent 
errors involve no human error, therefore, the individual working with the equipment was 




















Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Weighted Average
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CWE is the second-largest contributing factor to latent errors, with a proportional 
contribution of 32.37%. Latent errors’ high association with CWE is primarily due to the 
physical work environment (83.33%) as seen in Appendix I2. Control systems set out are 
unable to effectively control the energy associated with the hazards, therefore, 
management systems have failed in their task. There is no human error as the physical 
environment as set out was incorrectly controlled by the management systems. 
Figure 5.15 compares the weighted average for each relationship between the workplace 
factors and the human errors they cause. This figure indicates the high occurrence of 
CWE in routine violations in comparison to the other human errors. Shown in Figure 
5.15 is the contribution of SWP to both mistakes and slips and lapses is relatively large 
compared to the other human errors. Latent errors high contribution due to SWP is made 





The data presented in this section aims to build relationships between the type of human 
error and the workplace factors which caused the human error. Figures 5.11 to 5.14 
define the relationships between the human errors and the associated workplace factors. 
For each of the human errors across the three companies there were similar contributions 
seen by the respective workplace factors. The consistency does indicate that there is 
possibly an industry-wide trend in terms of workplace factors which cause the human 
errors. Figure 5.15 provided a comparison of the workplace factors weighted averages 












Mistakes Slips and Lapses Routine Violations Latent Error
CWE SWP FFPE CP
Figure 5.15: Human errors and weighted average of associated workplace factors 
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Relationships are now found between the organisational factors and the specific 
workplace factors that are caused by the organisational factors. Organisational factors 
provide understanding into the ways in which management level individuals can improve 
safety systems in the workspace. 
5.3.3. Organisational factor causation trends 
Organisational factors revolve around management level systems and demonstrates how 
the management layer of the civil construction company contributed to the failure 
pathway (Kines et al., 2010). Management systems which prove inefficient in correctly 
managing safety within the organisation contribute as organisational factors. 
Organisational factors cause workplace factors which in return cause human errors. 
Section 4.3.1.5 discussed the concept of organisational factors in more detail. 
Organisational factors are initially analysed using a proportional analysis which 
identifies the leading organisational factors which contributed to incidents. In total, 485 
organisational factors are analysed. After the proportional analysis, relationships are 
found between the organisational factors which cause the specific workplace factors. 
These relationships build understanding of how the improvement in specific 
organisational factors can contribute to reducing or eliminating specific workplace 
factors. 
5.3.3.1. Organisational factor proportions 
Organisational factors demonstrate the relationships to incidents caused by failure in 
management systems. The proportional contributions of each organisational factor to the 
total number of organisational factors is given for each of the three companies (Figures 
5.16, 5.17 and 5.18) and as a weighted average (Figure 5.19). The weighted average 
calculation for organisational factors is given in Equation 5.3 which demonstrates how 
the data in the table in Appendix J1 was obtained: 
𝑂𝐹 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (%) 
= (
(∑ 𝑂𝐹𝐶1×𝑊𝐹𝐶1)+(∑ 𝑂𝐹𝐶2×𝑊𝐹𝐶2)+(∑ 𝑂𝐹𝐶3×𝑊𝐹𝐶3)
𝑊𝐹𝐶1+𝑊𝐹𝐶2+𝑊𝐹𝐶3
) × 100   (5.3) 
Where: 
𝑥 ∈ {𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛, ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 
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𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,  
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒} 
 
𝑂𝐹  –    Proportion of Specific organisational factor for the  
   relevant company. 
𝑊𝐹  –    Count of total workplace factors for the relevant company. 
C1  –    Company 1 
C2  –    Company 2 
C3  –    Company 3 
For Equation 5.3 the proportional organisational factors are shown in Appendix J1 and 
the following values were used for the count of workplace factors: 
𝑊𝐹𝐶1  –  57 
𝑊𝐹𝐶2  –  118 
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Figure 5.16: Organisational factors 
proportional contribution company 1 
Figure 5.17: Organisational factors 
proportional contribution company 2 
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Figures 5.15 to 5.18 demonstrate that the leading organisational factor for each of the 
three companies is hazard identification, with a proportional contribution ranging from 
15.53% (Figure 5.17) to 20.88% (Figure 5.18) and a weighted average of 17.99% (Figure 
5.19). Hazard identification revolves around the organisation’s development of systems 
which both identifies all hazards present as well as prescribes suitable controls required 
for the magnitude of the hazard’s energy. The application of effective hazard 
identification allows for individuals to know what hazards are present in the current 
workspace. 
The second- and third-largest contributing organisational factors according to the 
weighted averages are risk management (11.78%) and auditing and monitoring (11.15%). 
Risk management is in relation to situations where there is a known risk which the 
organisation has chosen to not use effective risk control methods in dealing with it. In 
many of the assessed risk management-related incidents, the individuals involved did not 
deal with the risk as they underestimated its ability to cause harm. Auditing and 
monitoring involved situations whereby the organisation failed to properly monitor 
whether the controls are in place and whether the controls could effectively control the 
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Figure 5.18: Organisational factors 
proportional contribution company 3 
Figure 5.19: Organisational factors 
proportional contribution weighted average 
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individuals failed to regularly monitor the control effectiveness. Failure to assess these 
controls led to them being proven to be inefficient in controlling the energy source. 
Companies 1 and 2 demonstrate much higher proportions in procurement contributing to 
organisational factors compared to company 3, with contributions of 12.37% (Figure 
5.16) and 11.17% (Figure 5.17) compared to the 4.95% (Figure 5.18) contribution by 
company 3. In the assessed incident reports procurement often occurred due to the 
organisation using equipment purchased which only had the basics in terms of safety 
features or was unreliable. Availability and cost seemed to have been prioritised over 
safety features when purchasing the equipment. 
When viewing the data across the three companies, it is found that the organisational 
factors’ proportional contributions remain fairly consistent. Consistency was prescribed 
as instances where there was a proportional contribution deviation of 5% or less when 
comparing the minimum and maximum contribution for each organisational factor. 
According to the prescribed allowable deviation for consistency it is found that the hazard 
identification (company 2 compared to company 3) and procurement (companies 1 and 2 
compared to 3) were the only factors that were inconsistent across the three companies. 
This analysis aimed to prove that three separate companies have similar weaknesses in 
organisational factors which resulted in incidents occurring. 
Rankings are given for the organisational factor proportional contributions of each of the 
companies in Appendix J2. The ranking system is to provide information regarding 
comparison of the leading contributors of organisational factors for each company. 
Where organisational factors are highlighted in grey they are equal in ranking and 
percentage. 
Section 5.3.3.1 describes which organisational factors contribute the most to the 
incidents assessed. In the next section the failure pathway builds on this to show 
relationships as to which organisational factors cause specific workplace factors.  
5.3.3.2. Relationships between workplace factors and organisational factors  
Finding the relationship between organisational factors and workplace factors deepens 
our understanding of the causation pathway which lead to an incident occurring. The 
relationships between human errors and workplace factors were established in Section 
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5.3.2.2. Therefore, to link organisational factors and human errors, the relationship 
between organisational factors and workplace factors must be understood. Figures 5.19 
to 5.24 show the proportional contribution of organisational factors which caused the 










As shown in Figure 5.10, CWE is the largest contributing workplace factor to incidents, 
demonstrating the need for an improvement in the control of work environment. Figure 
5.20 displays the proportional contribution of the organisational factors which resulted 
in CWE-related incidents occurring. Figure 5.20 demonstrates that hazard identification 
is the leading organisational factor associated with CWE, contributing 25.72%. As 
shown in Appendix J4, 51.72% of hazard identification-related CWE incidents were 
behavioural whilst 48.28% were related to the physical work environment. Many incident 
reports assessed demonstrated a lack of correct identification of on-site hazards present 
within the working environment. In addition, where hazards were identified, they were 
ineffectively controlled for this type of working environment. CWE aims to control the 
work environment. In order to control the work environment hazard identification is a 
vital aspect. 
Following hazard identification, leadership (14.77%) and auditing and monitoring 
(13.34%), were the largest contributors to CWE-related incidents. As shown in Appendix 
J4, 93.33% of CWE incidents resulting from leadership failure, were due to the 
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behavioural working environment. Many leadership-related CWE incidents resulted from 
the incorrect behaviour of individuals not being corrected by supervisory or management-
level individuals. Auditing and monitoring shown in Appendix J4 has a small variation 
between behavioural (44.44%) and physical (55.56%) working environment. The 
incidents reported suggested situations where management-level individuals failed to 
check the condition of the construction workspace. The workspace requires the correct 












Figures 5.20 and 5.21 show the proportional contribution of the organisational factors 
which caused each of the two types of CWE, behavioural and physical work environment 
(Appendix J5). The behavioural work environment seen in Figure 5.21 shows large 
contributions from hazard identification (25.86%) and leadership (24.14%). Hazard 
identification is the largest contributor to both the behavioural and physical work 
environments. This is consistent with the contribution hazard identification made to the 
total CWE. Leadership, however, contributes 24.14% (Figure 5.21) to the behavioural 
work environment compared to the 14.77% (Figure 5.20) contribution to the total CWE. 
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Figure 5.21: Organisational factors linked to 
behavioural work environment  
Figure 5.22: Organisational factors linked to 
physical work environment  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 110  
 
environment. The large contribution of leadership to the behavioural work environment 
describes a situation in which safety leadership in civil construction is inadequate. Safety 
leadership is where leadership makes a conscious effort to improve safety in highly 
hazardous and complex working environments (Wu et al., 2016). It has been found by 
researchers that ineffective safety leadership has resulted directly in the increase of 
incidents and injuries in the workplace (Mullen and Kevin Kelloway, 2009). Safety 
leadership revolves around management level individuals practising safety principles that 
they instruct others to follow, providing an approach which focuses on following the 
correct safety procedures is promoted. 
For the physical work environment, it is found that hazard identification (25.45%) and 
risk management (25.45%) have the largest proportional contribution. Hazard 
identification is once again proportional with its total CWE contribution, which has been 
discussed relating to Figure 5.20. Risk management involves using effective risk control 
methods, which assess the risk and apply the relevant controls using knowledge gained 
through previous risk management practices (Bonsu et al., 2016). The physical work 
environment requires more effective means to control risk, for example the use of a flag 
to slow down traffic. This method attempts to deal with the risk in a means which if not 
adhered to, will not effectively control the risk. The physical work environment needs to 
be maintained with effective controls that can effectively contain the unwanted release of 
energy. This ensures that the means chosen in dealing with risk management is capable 































Figure 5.23: Organisational failures causing SWP failures 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 111  
 
Figure 5.23 shows the proportional contribution of organisational factors to SWP-related 
incidents. At 29.35%, SWP makes the second-largest proportional contribution to 
workplace factors. For SWP the largest contributor to incidents is risk management, 
contributing 23.29%. Risk management is the use of effective risk management methods 
in order to deal with a risk known to the organisation. The relationship between SWP and 
risk management is due to the use of substandard safety procedures, or to non-existent 
safety procedures, in order to deal with risk that the organisation is aware of. 
Task design and hazard identification make up the second- and third-largest contributors 
with 19.83% and 18.42% respectively. Task design ensures that all risks have been 
identified, and the risk has then been dealt with through correct risk control methods. 
SWP’s relation to task design is found where procedures did not identify risk and 
therefore suitable methods of risk control were not implemented. Hazard identification 
and SWP build the relationship based on procedures being created before correctly 
identifying the hazards present. Work procedures should be developed which can 
effectively control the magnitude of the identified hazard’s energy. In doing so the 
procedure acts as a very necessary control. If work practices fail to account for risk and 






























Figure 5.24: Organisational failures causing FFPE failures 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Page | 112  
 
Figure 5.24 shows the proportional contribution of organisational factors to FFPE-related 
incidents. The largest contributing organisational factor to FFPE is procurement at 
39.77%. Procurement ensures that the equipment bought is of a suitable standard and is 
the correct equipment for the desired task. The relationship between FFPE and 
procurement in the incident reports assessed often contained cases where the equipment 
bought for the task was not fit for purpose or lacked essential safety features.  
Design (21.83%) is the second-largest organisational factor leading to FFPE-related 
incidents. The use of equipment which lacks clear safety standards in order to complete 
the task is categorised as design. FFPE and design are then related through the use of 
equipment that does not fit the purpose in terms of required safety features. Planned 
maintenance contributed 10.91% to the occurrence of FFPE-related incidents. Planned 
maintenance ensured equipment was in correct working order through regular inspections 
and/or maintenance. The incident reports involving planned maintenance which caused 
FFPE-related incidents frequently involved the use of equipment which was not in correct 
working order. Individuals maintaining the equipment should have realised this through 
regular inspection. If this equipment was maintained correctly the probability of an 










Figure 5.25 depicts the relationship between CP and the associated organisational 





















Figure 5.25: Organisational failures causing CP failures 
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competence which contributes 46.33% to the total. In many of the incident reports 
training and competence-related CP incidents occurred due to workers not understanding 
the correct method to complete a certain task. Training and competence ensures that 
individuals are trained in the correct method to perform a task with safety considerations 
taken into account. Training and competence has a relationship with CP as it ensures that 
individuals receive the correct training in the completion of the task and are competent in 
this task. 
Communication (15.03%) and leadership (11.14%) are responsible for resulting in the 
next-largest contribution to CP. The incident reports found that a large number of CP 
incidents occurred due to individuals not understanding the correct safety protocol. The 
inability to understand the correct safety protocol leads to the root cause of the incident, 
being the organisational factor communication. In the case of leadership it is found that 
violations in the completion of task is not being corrected by supervision or management. 
In the incident reports, a large number of CP-related incidents occurred due to incorrect 
safety practices. These practices were not corrected and thus occurred due to leadership 
being ineffective. As found for the behavioural work environment, CP is also affected 
due to safety leadership being ineffective. 
This section has shown relationships between organisational factors and the specific 
workplace factors that they cause. In this section, the relationships have been explained, 
providing the reason that strong relationships exist between specific factors. The 
relationships support the idea that management systems can be improved to reduce 
specific organisational factors, in the process reducing specific workplace factors. 
5.4. Major incident causation failure pathways 
The failure pathway involved in incident causation is developed from organisational 
factors which cause workplace factors, which then cause human errors and incidents to 
occur. Focusing on the South African civil construction industry, more specifically the 
three companies assessed, a definitive failure pathway is established in Figure 5.26. The 


























When reviewing the incident reports assessed it was found that a majority of these 
recommended the use of either disciplinary action or training as the chosen method to 
deal with the individuals involved. Viewing the incident failure pathway in Figure 5.26 it 
becomes evident that training and discipline is not effective in reducing incidents in the 
South African civil construction industry. 
As seen in Figure 5.26, 50.67% of human errors involved in incidents are mistakes. In 
order to reduce the occurrence of mistakes, management systems should implement 
effective controls which prevent uncontrolled energy release. Training teaches the way to 
perform specific tasks but is not effective if individuals are placed on the wrong task, 
whilst disciplinary action does not solve the gap in knowledge of the individual. This 
provides the evidence that training and disciplinary actions will not effectively control 
mistakes. In order to understand why individuals are performing tasks without the correct 
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CWE (39.66%) and SWP (29.15%) are the leading workplace factors across the assessed 
incidents. CWE describes a work environment within which both the physical and 
behavioural work environments are under control. For the work environment to be under 
control, on-site leadership should ensure a safe working environment whereby hazards 
are effectively controlled. To ensure that the individuals performing the tasks have a 
procedure which prioritises safety, effective SWP is vital. CWE and SWP cannot be 
effectively reduced through training and discipline as they are not the fault of the 
individual who performs the human error. The management systems should effectively 
account for on-site leadership and procedures which control the hazards at their source.  
The leading organisational factor is hazard identification, contributing 17.99%. Hazards 
should be clearly identified to all workers and accounted for in the development of 
resilient controls which prohibit uncontrolled energy release. These controls are to be of 
an adequate standard to account for the magnitude of the hazard’s energy. Management 
systems are to set out these controls. As this is the leading organisational factor it 
demonstrates management has failed to do this. This once again indicates that discipline 
and training are not a correct response, as management needs to improve their own 
systems in order to prevent harm to individuals performing the tasks. Auditing and 
monitoring as the third-highest contributing organisational factor also indicates that 
management has not been proactive in continually assessing that current controls are up 
to standard. Risk management also indicates that management has been unresponsive in 
correctly assessing the level of risk individuals are exposed to along with the means to 
deal with this risk.  
The method of training and disciplinary action in dealing with incidents is ineffective and 
will not result in the reduction or prevention of future incidents. The incidents need to be 
dealt with at an organisational level, turning focus away from a ‘culture of blame’ directed 
at the individuals involved. In order to deal with these incidents, management systems 
need to be reassessed ensuring that they apply effective controls to on-site hazards. The 
use of effective controls and the identification of hazards potentially have a direct effect 
on reducing incidents and removing the potential of human error occurring.  
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5.5. Chapter 5 summary  
Chapter 5 explained the data analysis process and showed the key findings for the study. 
Section 5.3.1 started with the discussion of the human errors involved in the incident 
reports analysed. Across the 66 incidents, it was found that 191 human errors had 
occurred that led to these incidents. The proportional contribution of human errors 
developed the conclusion that mistakes contributed 50.67% of human errors across the 
three companies. Section 5.3.2.1 provided the proportional contribution of workplace 
factors, where 284 workplace factors were found and analysed. The leading workplace 
factor was found to be CWE which contributed a weighted average of 39.66% of all 
workplace factors. Section 5.3.2.2 found relationships between the human errors and the 
workplace factors which caused them. Analysing each human error, it was found that for 
mistakes, slips and lapses, and routine violations CWE made the largest contribution. 
Section 5.3.3.1 analysed the proportional contribution of each organisational factor, 
where 485 organisational factors were analysed. The proportional analysis found that 
hazard identification was the leading organisational factor, with a contribution of 
17.99% to the weighted average. Section 5.3.3.2 found relationships between the 
organisational factors and the workplace factors they caused. The findings of Section 
5.3.3.2 found the following largest contributors for each workplace factor; CWE and 
hazard identification (25.72%), SWP and risk management (23.29%), FFPE and 
procurement (39.77%), CP and training and competence (46.33%). Strong relationships 
have been found between the workplace factors and the organisational factors which 
cause them. The relationships found provide links between the three incident causation 
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Chapter 6.  
Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5 the data analysis and results have been summarised and presented to the 
reader. The analysed data provided information regarding the leading incident causation 
factors for the three South African civil construction companies. A South African civil 
construction industry-wide perspective is gained through the weighted average across the 
three companies. 
Chapter 6 aims to summarise this study and the insight gained into incident causation 
within the South African civil construction industry. Section 6.2 summarises the findings 
of the study by providing key conclusions drawn. Chapter 6 ends by demonstrating the 
possible benefits this study has made to the South African civil construction industry 
(Section 6.4) and the recommendation of future work (Section 6.5) that could be 
developed from this studies key findings. Concluding that this study has made significant 
findings that could possibly benefit the industry in future understanding of incident 
causation. 
6.2. Conclusion 
This section summarises the major findings of the study drawing out the key conclusions 
developed. Key conclusions are those which are most relevant to the objectives and aims 
set out in Sections 1.4 and 1.6. There are five key conclusions which are discussed below. 
Relationships are proven to exist between the incident causation factors, namely between 
human errors and workplace factors, and between workplace factors and organisational 
factors. Shown and explained in Sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.3.2, strong relationships do exist 
between particular incident causation factors. The primary relationship is found between 
the leading incident causation factors, where it is found that mistakes primarily occur due 
to CWE failures and CWE failures are primarily occurring due to hazard identification. 
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These relationships show that if a work environment is not being controlled in both the 
physical and behavioural aspects, mistakes are likely to occur on a more common basis. 
These relationships also show that in order for the working environment to remain under 
control, the identification and correct control of all hazards present is essential. The 
relationships develop an understanding of how the majority of incidents are occurring 
within the South African civil construction industry. Understanding of these relationships 
is essential in preventing the future occurrence of incidents. 
The leading incident causation factors were found in Section 5.3.1.1, 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.3.1. 
The leading incident causation factors were mistakes, CWE and hazard identification, 
showing similarity to the leading relationship between the incident causation factors. 
Mistakes as the leading human error were found to result in 50.67% of human error, 
therefore, accounting for more than half of the human error which occurred. CWE as the 
leading workplace factor accounted for 39.66% of workplace factors. CWE was also 
found to have occurred in 56 of the 66 incident reports assessed. This indicates that CWE 
can be considered as playing a role in the majority of incidents occurring. Hazard 
identification occurred in 17.99% of organisational factors. The leading source of the 
development of the failure pathway is the leading organisational factor which is hazard 
identification. 
The findings from the comparison of the South African civil construction and mining 
industries incident statistics, Section 4.2.1, showed that the South African civil 
construction industry requires improvements in their methods of incident control. This 
comparison identifies that in terms of fatality frequency rate, the civil construction 
industry has a lack of control over the occurrence of fatalities. The mining industry has 
managed to successfully reduce their fatality frequency rates. In terms of injury frequency 
rates, both industries have been successful in making steady reductions. The key 
difference is that civil construction has an injury frequency rate substantially greater than 
that of mining. Civil constructions high injury frequency rate and uncontrolled fatality 
frequency rate shows an industry which is struggling to control or reduce the occurrence 
of incidents.  
Methods used in dealing with incidents are often found to centre around training and 
discipline of the individuals involved. Training and discipline would essentially only be 
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effective in reducing CP related incidents, which account for 11% of all workplace 
factors. Having knowledge of the leading incident causation factors and the relationships 
between incident causation factors shows that other methods are required for effective 
control of incidents. Dealing with incidents should take a more proactive approach, not 
focusing on the reactive approach of disciplining the individuals performing the task. 
The final key conclusion drawn from this study is that incidents are not occurring as the 
fault of human error. Incidents are occurring due to a failure in management systems and 
controls at an organisational level. The failure is in reference to both workplace factors 
and organisational factors which develop the source of the failure pathway. This source 
of the failure pathway develops the failures in controls and eventually the resultant 
incident through the uncontrolled energy release. In order to deal with incidents, the 
understanding of these factors and the relationships between the incident causation factors 
is essential.  
The key conclusions show why this study can benefit the South African civil construction 
industry. Providing an insight into incident causation within the South African civil 
construction industry. The civil construction industry can apply this study to understand 
what is leading to the occurrence of incidents. 
6.3. Industry benefits 
The three main contributions that this study could make to the South African civil 
construction industry are the following: 
• Taking focus away from analysing singular incidents in isolation and benefit from 
analysing multiple incidents. 
• Understanding leading incident causations for the South African civil construction 
industry. 
• Understanding the relationships between incident causation factors and the failure 
pathway that leads to incidents occurring.  
Viewing incidents as singular isolated events does not help develop an understanding of 
common incident causations. A cross-sectional view through analysis of multiple 
incidents builds understanding of leading incident causations. The understanding of 
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incident causation gained through the cross-sectional view can be utilised for the benefit 
of the South African civil construction industries. Multiple incidents provide incident 
causation trends and relationships between incident causation. Solving singular incidents 
in isolation does not allow for understanding of causation to be developed. This singular 
view of incidents then often allows for the event to reoccur due to the fundamental 
problem not being solved. The cross-sectional view of incidents prevents this. Through 
the understanding so gained, incidents can be targeted and resolved at the source, 
preventing similar incidents from reoccurring. 
Analysing the data collected for this study identifies the leading incident causation factors 
for the South African civil construction industry. The leading organisational factors, 
workplace factors and human errors are identified. Identification of the leading incident 
causation factors allows for the development of resilient management systems which 
better control the hazard’s energy. Understanding of what causes an incident is a crucial 
step in developing these management systems and setting effective controls in place. 
Through the findings in Sections 5.3.1.1, 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.3.1 the leading incident 
causation factors are explained. The explanations given in these Sections describe each 
incident causation factor. Through understanding these, incidents can be greatly reduced. 
Incident causation factors cause incidents through what is known as the failure pathway. 
The failure pathway forms through organisational factors causing workplace factors 
which in turn cause human errors. Many organisational factors may contribute to a single 
workplace factor, after which many workplace factors may contribute to a single human 
error. The relationships developed in Sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.3.2 explain the failure 
pathway. Section 5.3.2.2 provides relationships between the workplace factors and the 
human errors which they cause. Understanding these relationships demonstrates that the 
reduction of certain workplace factors may have a direct effect on the reduction of certain 
human errors. Furthermore, Section 5.3.3.2 shows relationships between organisational 
factors and the workplace factors which they cause. This demonstrates how the reduction 
of specific organisational factors may have a direct effect on the reduction of specific 
workplace factors. The relationships given in Sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.3.2 are analysed to 
provide insight as to how incident causation factors affect one another, forming the failure 
pathway. Essentially, by applying the knowledge gained in this study, better controls can 
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be put in place through resilient management systems which prevent the failure pathway 
from forming.  
The incident causation failure pathway is described in further detail in Section 5.4. This 
reveals that the South African civil construction industry has a current focus on the use 
of training and discipline to reduce or prevent the occurrence of incidents. Viewing the 
incident causation failure pathway, it is made clear in Section 5.4 that these methods are 
not effective. Incidents need to be dealt with at the core problem, focusing on 
management systems to be more resilient with the correct controls. The use of the correct 
controls and resilient systems would potentially have a direct effect in reducing or 
preventing the occurrence of incidents.  
This study has provided the basic information for understanding incident causation. 
Implementation of better controls from this information could potentially have a direct 
positive effect on safety in the South African civil construction industry. 
6.4. Recommendations for future work 
In order to expand on the findings of this study, recommendations have been developed 
from the conclusions. The recommendations are given whereby the South African civil 
construction industry can implement these. 
The first conclusion revolved around the understanding of the relationships between the 
incident causation factors for the South African civil construction industry. This 
conclusion promotes that from this understanding the industry can develop improved 
management systems and controls. The improvement of these management systems 
focuses on reducing incidents from a perspective of understanding incident causation 
relationships. In order to prevent the occurrence of mistakes, the reduction of CWE 
failures is essential, which in turn is gained through improved hazard identification. 
This leads to an organisation which focus on the correct controls being implemented 
and the identification of all hazards. This principle can be applied in order to reduce the 
occurrence of incidents occurring due to all incident causation factors. 
Identification of the leading incident causation factors shows the specific areas the 
industry can improve on in order to reduce the occurrence of incidents. Improvements in 
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the areas of mistakes, CWE and hazard identification is the key focus of the industry. 
Reducing these forms of incident causation factors can have a large impact on reducing 
the number of incidents which are occurring within the South African civil construction 
industry. 
The comparison drawn between the South African civil construction and mining 
industries developed the argument for improved incident control in the civil 
construction industry. The adopting of principles similar to those used in the mining 
industry can help improve safety in the civil construction industry. The mining 
industries implementation of the culture transformation framework (CTF) described in 
Section 4.2.3 is an example of such principles. The CTF involves prioritising safety as 
the leading concern for the mining industry. Focus is on the reduction and management 
of risk. If civil construction could place safety as the key industry concern, they could 
potentially receive a similar reduction in the occurrence of incidents. 
Methods of training and discipline are ineffective in dealing with the occurrence of 
incidents. This means that the civil construction industry needs to move away from a 
culture of ‘blame’, whereby individuals involved in the incident are seen as being the 
cause. Efforts must rather be applied to developing improved methods of incident 
control, moving away from focusing on the human error. 
Improved methods of incident control can be used to reduce incidents at the source of 
the failure pathway. Focusing on effective controls being designated for the 
organisational factors is essential in the control of incidents. This method aims to 
prevent the failure pathway from forming, in the process removing the potential for 
incidents to occur. 
The recommendations made from the study should ideally be implemented by the South 
African civil construction industry. This implementation can lead to an industry that has 
effective means to control the occurrence of incidents and boost safety for employees.  
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Appendix B: 
Appendix B1: Civil construction 
number of injuries 
  Number of Injuries 




2007 95138 3829 6602 10431 
2008 109173 4173 6700 10873 
2009 119900 4449 5887 10336 
2010 116072 3925 5192 9117 
2011 117548 3323 4671 7994 
2012 129034 3422 4959 8381 
2013 138593 3614 5029 8643 
2014 141752 3703 4973 8676 
2015 133549 3356 5132 8488 
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Appendix B2: Civil construction 
number of fatalities 
  Number of Fatalities 
Year No. Workers Civil 
Construction 
Other Sectors Total building 
industry 
2007 95138 33 39 72 
2008 109173 32 35 67 
2009 119900 36 37 73 
2010 116072 61 38 99 
2011 117548 28 23 51 
2012 129034 40 36 76 
2013 138593 52 42 94 
2014 141752 30 36 66 
2015 133549 37 30 67 
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Appendix B3: Incident frequency 
rates 
Year Injury incident frequency 
rate 
Fatalities incident frequency 
rate 
2007 4.020 0.035 
2008 3.820 0.029 
2009 3.710 0.030 
2010 3.380 0.053 
2011 2.830 0.024 
2012 2.650 0.031 
2013 2.610 0.038 
2014 2.610 0.021 
2015 2.510 0.028 
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Appendix C: 










Page | 137  
 
Appendix D:  
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Appendix E: 
Appendix E1: Mining industry 
incident statistics 
Year No. Workers Number of injuries Number of fatalities 
2007 469351 3867 220 
2008 489791 3750 171 
2009 466395 3650 168 
2010 475298 3438 127 
2011 487261 3299 123 
2012 497607 3377 112 
2013 510099 3126 93 
2014 468030 2700 84 
2015 479062 3138 77 
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Appendix E2: Mining industry 
incident frequency rates 
Year Injury frequency rate Fatality frequency rate 
2007 0.820 0.047 
2008 0.770 0.035 
2009 0.780 0.036 
2010 0.720 0.027 
2011 0.680 0.025 
2012 0.680 0.023 
2013 0.610 0.018 
2014 0.580 0.018 
2015 0.660 0.016 















df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.193939394 0.193939394 0.001605781 0.969017571
Residual 8 966.2060606 120.7757576
Total 9 966.4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -59.1272727 2433.791615 -0.0242943 0.981212912 -5671.460802 5553.206256 -5671.460802 5553.206256









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 19152.10909 19152.11 88.6933 1.32598E-05
Residual 8 1727.490909 215.9364
Total 9 20879.6
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 30772.74545 3254.29109 9.456052 1.29E-05 23268.33674 38277.15417 23268.33674 38277.15417
X Variable 1 -15.23636364 1.617841299 -9.41771 1.33E-05 -18.96711236 -11.50561491 -18.96711236 -11.50561491
Appendix F: 
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 9.98904E-05 9.98904E-05 1.288424395 0.28920014
Residual 8 0.000620233 7.75291E-05
Total 9 0.000720123
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.244642767 1.949960691 1.15112206 0.282922737 -2.25197465 6.741260184 -2.25197465 6.741260184
X Variable 1 -0.00110036 0.000969405 -1.135087836 0.28920014 -0.003335813 0.001135092 -0.003335813 0.001135092








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000846825 0.000846825 63.64184783 4.4559E-05
Residual 8 0.000106449 1.33061E-05
Total 9 0.000953274
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 6.470559423 0.8078281 8.00982217 4.32842E-05 4.607704485 8.333414362 4.607704485 8.333414362
X Variable 1 -0.003203833 0.000401604 -7.977584085 4.4559E-05 -0.004129934 -0.002277732 -0.004129934 -0.002277732
















Page | 145  
 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 3.035522727 3.035522727 71.56566468 2.91458E-05
Residual 8 0.339327273 0.042415909
Total 9 3.37485
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 388.8972727 45.60977136 8.526621842 2.75198E-05 283.7209514 494.0735941 283.7209514 494.0735941
X Variable 1 -0.191818182 0.022674484 -8.459649206 2.91458E-05 -0.244105636 -0.139530728 -0.244105636 -0.139530728








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.048242727 0.048242727 38.41259501 0.000260054
Residual 8 0.010047273 0.001255909
Total 9 0.05829
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 49.33272727 7.848246001 6.285828358 0.000236372 31.23463954 67.43081501 31.23463954 67.43081501
X Variable 1 -0.024181818 0.003901684 -6.197789526 0.000260054 -0.033179118 -0.015184518 -0.033179118 -0.015184518
Appendix F3: Injury frequency rate 
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Is it a active or 
latent failure?
Active failure
Was there intent in  
the action?
Intention clear
Is this action 
considered out of 
the norm?
Deviant Violation




Was there a lack of 
knowledge? 




Lack of knowledege. 




Appendix G:  
Appendix G1. Human errors 
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• Was fit for purpose 
equipment used for 
completion of this task?
• Was the equipment in 
good working order, with 
adequate safety features?
• If not, workplace factor: 
FFPE 
CWE
• Does the physical work 
environment account for 
safety aspects?
• Are incorrect work 
practices being 
controlled and corrected?
• If not, workplace factor: 
CWE 
• Stipulate whether CWE 




• Were the correct 
individuals, with the 
correct skill levels 
completing the task?
• Were the individuals 
completing the task 
competent in doing so?
• If not, workplace factor: 
CP
SWP
• Were there procedures in 
place which individuals 
were following to 
complete the task?
• Were the work 
procedures in place 
adequate in ensuring 
employee safety?
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Appendix G3: Organisational factors 
checklist 
Organisational Checklist 
Are individuals auditing and monitoring 
that safety controls within the system are 
able to deal with work environment? 
YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Auditing and Monitoring 
Are individuals auditing and monitoring 
that safety controls within the system are 
being adhered to? 
YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Auditing and Monitoring 
Do individuals completing the task seem 




Are individuals communicating safety 




Is the equipment and the workplace 





Has the hazard been identified? YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Hazard Identification 
Are the controls in place efficient in 




Insert: Hazard Identification 
Are individuals following safety protocol 






Has the incident which occurred, not 




Insert: Learning from Incidents 
Has the equipment been maintained 




Insert: Planned Maintenance 
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Organisational Checklist 






Does the equipment being purchased 
meet safety standards for the completion 




Are identified risks being dealt with? YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Risk Management 
Are effective risk control methods being 
used to deal with identified risk? 
YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Risk Management 
Is the company prioritising safety 
requirement over other goals? 
YES. 
NO.  
Insert: Strategic Management 




Insert: Task Design 




Insert: Task Design 
Did the individual performing the task 




Insert: Training and Competence 
Was the individual assessed to be 
competent before completing the task? 
YES. 
NO.  
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Appendix H: 
Appendix H1: Human error 
proportion table 
Human Error Proportion 
Latent (Company 1) 10.00% 
Latent (Company 2) 7.50% 
Latent (Company 3) 6.17% 
Latent (Weighted Average) 7.14% 
Mistake (Company 1) 53.33% 
Mistake (Company 2) 45.00% 
Mistake (Company 3) 54.32% 
Mistake (Weighted Average) 50.67% 
Routine Violation (Company 1) 16.67% 
Routine Violation (Company 2) 20.00% 
Routine Violation (Company 3) 18.52% 
Routine Violation (Weighted Average) 18.86% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 1) 20.00% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 2) 27.50% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 3) 20.99% 
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Appendix H2: Time of day and 
associated human errors 
No. of Human 
errors 





Afternoon 4 41 17 16 78 
Morning 9 52 19 29 109 
Percentage of 
Human errors 





Afternoon 5.13% 52.56% 21.79% 20.51% 100.00% 
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Appendix H3: Day of week and 
associated human error proportions 
 
Latent Mistake Routine  
Violation 
Slip &  
Lapse 
Monday 16.00% 44.00% 24.00% 16.00% 
Tuesday 4.76% 52.38% 16.67% 26.19% 
Wednesday 8.11% 40.54% 18.92% 32.43% 
Thursday 2.78% 47.22% 22.22% 27.78% 
Friday 4.76% 61.90% 23.81% 9.52% 
Saturday 15.00% 55.00% 10.00% 20.00% 
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Appendix H4: Day of week and 
associated number of human errors  
 
Latent Mistake Routine 
Violation 
Slip & Lapse Grand 
Total 
Monday 4 11 6 4 25 
Tuesday 2 22 7 11 42 
Wednesday 3 15 7 12 37 
Thursday 1 17 8 10 36 
Friday 1 13 5 2 21 
Saturday 3 11 2 4 20 
Sunday  7 1 2 10 
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Appendix I: 
Appendix I1: Workplace factor 
proportion table 
Workplace Factor Proportion 
CP (Company 1) 12.28% 
CP (Company 2) 7.50% 
CP (Company 3) 14.06% 
CP (Weighted Average) 11.03% 
CWE (Company 1) 38.60% 
CWE (Company 2) 37.50% 
CWE (Company 3) 42.19% 
CWE (Weighted Average) 39.66% 
FFPE (Company 1) 22.81% 
FFPE (Company 2) 23.75% 
FFPE (Company 3) 15.63% 
FFPE (Weighted Average) 20.16% 
SWP (Company 1) 26.32% 
SWP (Company 2) 31.25% 
SWP (Company 3) 28.13% 
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Appendix I2: Human error and 
associated behavioural and physical 
work environment for CWE 
 
Behavioural Physical 
Latent 16.67% 83.33% 
Mistake 42.31% 57.69% 
Routine Violation 83.33% 16.67% 
Slip & Lapse 40.00% 60.00% 
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Appendix I3: Human error and 
associated workplace factor 
proportions 
  CP CWE FFPE SWP 
Latent (Company 1) 0.00% 60.00% 20.00% 20.00% 
Latent (Company 2) 0.00% 14.29% 71.43% 14.29% 
Latent (Company 3) 0.00% 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 
Latent (Weighted Average) 0.00% 32.37% 58.50% 9.12% 
Mistake (Company 1) 12.90% 32.26% 25.81% 29.03% 
Mistake (Company 2) 24.19% 35.48% 17.74% 22.58% 
Mistake (Company 3) 14.55% 32.73% 20.00% 32.73% 
Mistake (Weighted Average) 18.33% 33.81% 19.97% 27.90% 
Routine Violation (Company 1) 25.00% 50.00% 8.33% 16.67% 
Routine Violation (Company 2) 5.56% 61.11% 22.22% 11.11% 
Routine Violation (Company 3) 16.00% 52.00% 4.00% 28.00% 
Routine Violation (Weighted Average) 13.04% 55.50% 12.31% 19.15% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 1) 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 2) 0.00% 34.38% 37.50% 28.13% 
Slip and Lapse (Company 3) 12.50% 41.67% 4.17% 41.67% 
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Appendix J: 
Appendix J1: Organisational factor 
proportion table 
Organisational factor Proportion 
Auditing and Monitoring (Company 1) 10.31% 
Auditing and Monitoring (Company 2) 10.68% 
Auditing and Monitoring (Company 3) 12.09% 
Auditing and Monitoring (Weighted Average) 11.15% 
Communication (Company 1) 8.25% 
Communication (Company 2) 5.34% 
Communication (Company 3) 3.30% 
Communication (Weighted Average) 5.14% 
Design (Company 1) 9.28% 
Design (Company 2) 9.71% 
Design (Company 3) 10.44% 
Design (Weighted Average) 9.90% 
Hazard Identification (Company 1) 17.53% 
Hazard Identification (Company 2) 15.53% 
Hazard Identification (Company 3) 20.88% 
Hazard Identification (Weighted Average) 17.99% 
Leadership (Company 1) 9.28% 
Leadership (Company 2) 10.19% 
Leadership (Company 3) 10.99% 
Leadership (Weighted Average) 10.32% 
Learning from Incidents (Company 1) 5.15% 
Learning from Incidents (Company 2) 4.37% 
Learning from Incidents (Company 3) 1.65% 
Learning from Incidents (Weighted Average) 3.48% 
Planned Maintenance (Company 1) 2.06% 
Planned Maintenance (Company 2) 3.88% 
Planned Maintenance (Company 3) 1.65% 
Planned Maintenance (Weighted average) 2.66% 
Procurement (Company 1) 12.37% 
Procurement (Company 2) 11.17% 
Procurement (Company 3) 4.95% 
Procurement (Weighted Average) 9.02% 
Risk Management (Company 1) 11.34% 
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Risk Management (Company 2) 10.19% 
Risk Management (Company 3) 13.74% 
Risk Management (Weighted Average) 11.78% 
Strategic Planning (Company 1) 2.06% 
Strategic Planning (Company 2) 2.91% 
Strategic Planning (Company 3) 5.49% 
Strategic Planning (Weighted Average) 3.73% 
Task Design (Company 1) 8.25% 
Task Design (Company 2) 8.74% 
Task Design (Company 3) 10.99% 
Task Design (Weighted Average) 9.50% 
Training and Competence (Company 1) 4.12% 
Training and Competence (Company 2) 7.28% 
Training and Competence (Company 3) 3.85% 
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Appendix J2: Ranked organisational 
factors contribution to incidents 




























5 Leadership Leadership Task Design Design 
6 Design Design Design Task Design 
7 Communication Task Design Strategic 
Planning 
Procurement 
8 Task Design Training and 
Competence 
Procurement Training and 
Competence 
9 Learning from 
Incidents 
Communication Training & 
Competence 
Communication 
























Page | 160  
 
Appendix J3: Workplace factors and associated 
organisational factors proportional contributions 
  Auditing and 
Monitoring 
Communication Design Hazard 
Identification 
Leadership Learning from 
Incidents 
CP (Company 1) 0.00% 22.22% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 11.11% 
CP (Company 2) 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 4.00% 16.00% 0.00% 
CP (Company 3) 5.9% 5.88% 5.88% 23.53% 5.88% 0.00% 
CP (Weighted 
Average) 
2.26% 15.03% 2.26% 10.69% 11.14% 2.23% 
CWE (Company 1) 11.63% 9.30% 6.98% 27.91% 13.95% 6.98% 
CWE (Company 2) 13.64% 6.82% 6.82% 23.86% 14.77% 5.68% 
CWE (Company 3) 13.92% 3.80% 8.86% 26.58% 15.19% 2.53% 
CWE (Weighted 
Average) 
13.34% 6.16% 7.63% 25.72% 14.77% 4.73% 
FFPE (Company 1) 14.29% 0.00% 19.05% 0.00% 4.76% 0.00% 
FFPE (Company 2) 3.85% 0.00% 19.23% 5.77% 3.85% 7.69% 
FFPE (Company 3) 13.04% 0.00% 26.09% 4.35% 8.70% 0.00% 
FFPE (Weighted 
Average) 
9.47% 0.00% 21.83% 4.07% 5.89% 3.20% 
SWP (Company 1) 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 20.00% 4.00% 4.00% 
SWP (Company 2) 19.51% 0.00% 9.76% 17.07% 4.88% 0.00% 
SWP (Company 3) 11.11% 3.17% 7.94% 19.05% 7.94% 1.59% 
SWP (Weighted 
Average) 
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CP (Company 1) 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 44.44% 
CP (Company 2) 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 4.00% 52.00% 
CP (Company 3) 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 5.88% 0.00% 41.18% 
CP (Weighted 
Average) 0.00% 0.00% 6.15% 2.26% 1.66% 46.33% 
CWE (Company 1) 0.00% 2.33% 13.95% 2.33% 4.65% 0.00% 
CWE (Company 2) 3.41% 1.14% 7.95% 4.55% 11.36% 0.00% 
CWE (Company 3) 0.00% 1.27% 11.39% 7.59% 8.86% 0.00% 
CWE (Weighted 
Average) 1.42% 1.42% 10.48% 5.27% 9.06% 0.00% 
FFPE (Company 1) 9.52% 52.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
FFPE (Company 2) 9.62% 42.31% 5.77% 0.00% 0.00% 1.92% 
FFPE (Company 3) 13.04% 30.43% 0.00% 4.35% 0.00% 0.00% 
FFPE (Weighted 
Average) 10.91% 39.77% 2.40% 1.67% 0.00% 0.80% 
SWP (Company 1) 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 4.00% 24.00% 0.00% 
SWP (Company 2) 0.00% 0.00% 24.39% 4.88% 17.07% 2.44% 
SWP (Company 3) 0.00% 1.59% 23.81% 3.17% 20.63% 0.00% 
SWP (Weighted 
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Appendix J4: Physical and 
behavioural working environments 
proportional contributions to 
organisational factors 
Organisational factor Behavioural Physical 
Auditing and Monitoring 44.44% 55.56% 
Communication 50.00% 50.00% 
Design 11.11% 88.89% 
Hazard Identification 51.72% 48.28% 
Leadership 93.33% 6.67% 
Learning from Incidents 75.00% 25.00% 
Planned Maintenance 50.00% 50.00% 
Procurement 100.00% 0.00% 
Risk Management 17.65% 82.35% 
Strategic Planning 50.00% 50.00% 
Task Design 87.50% 12.50% 
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Appendix J5: Organisational factors 
proportional contributions to 
behavioural and physical working 
environment 
Organisational factor Behavioural Physical 
Auditing and Monitoring 13.79% 18.18% 
Communication 5.17% 5.45% 
Design 1.72% 14.55% 
Hazard Identification 25.86% 25.45% 
Leadership 24.14% 1.82% 
Learning from Incidents 5.17% 1.82% 
Planned Maintenance 1.72% 1.82% 
Procurement 1.72% 0.00% 
Risk Management 5.17% 25.45% 
Strategic Planning 3.45% 3.64% 
Task Design 12.07% 1.82% 
Training and Competence 0.00% 0.00% 
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